

# Selected Papers

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Northern Plains Conference on

Early British Literature

hosted by Mayville State University

April 10<sup>th</sup> & 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015

Conference Proceedings Edited by Erin Lord Kunz

# Acknowledgements

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# Northern Plains Conference on Early British Literature

## Conference Program

Friday, April 10<sup>th</sup>

9:00 Heritage:

- “Sainted Anne Hutchinson”

Carolyn Baker, Mayville State University

- “The Performance of Chaste Masculinity in *King Horn*”

Ruth Gripenrog, University of North Dakota

- "The Image of the Astrologer in English Literature, 1650-1725"

Bill Branson, St. Cloud State University

9:00 Fishbowl:

Rewriting Master Narratives: An Undergraduate Panel

Presenter: Stephen Hamrick, Minnesota State University Moorhead

- “Debunking Ethnocentrism In *The Tempest*”

Natalie Devick, Minnesota State University Moorhead

- “Eurocentrism and the New World: Samuel Daniel's ‘Epistle. To Prince Henrie’”

Allen King, Minnesota State University Moorhead

- “Redefining Eve”

Taija Noel, Minnesota State University Moorhead

10:15: Heritage

- “The Obligations of the Husting in Lazamon's *Brut*”

William Christopher Brown, University of Minnesota—Crookston

- "Looking at Beauty in *Beowulf*"

Peter A. Ramey, Northern State University

- “Learned Wit and University reform in 18th-century Oxford”

Judith Dorn, St. Cloud University

12:15: Heritage

- “Saying it with Flowers: Ophelia's Bouquet in Films of Hamlet ”

Bruce Brandt, South Dakota State University

- “Miltonic Radicalism and Cultural Revolution in A.S. Byatt's *Possession*”

Kevin Windhauser

- “Radical Feminist Experiments: Radcliffe’s Endings as Rational Utopias”

Kacie Jossart, University of North Dakota

12:15 Fishbowl

- “Women and Religious Resistance in Aemilia Lanyer’s *Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum*”

Katelyn McCarthy, University of Minnesota

- “‘But She Knew How To Govern Them’: Self-Discipline as Feminist Argument in Jane Austen’s *Sense and Sensibility*”

Audrey D. Johnson, University of North Dakota

- “Beyond Feminist Misogyny: Wollstonecraft’s “Conscious Dignity, or Satanic Pride” and Milton in *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*”

Yon Ji Sol, University of Minnesota

1:30 Heritage

- “Variety of Language in Shakespeare’s *Love’s Labor’s Lost*”

Bob De Smith, Dordt College

- “Blank Confusion”: The Blinding Metropolis in Book Seventh of Wordsworth’s *The Prelude* (1805)

Sung Jin Shin, University of Minnesota

- “Men “Brought Up of Nought”: Comparing Class Structure in *Le Morte Darthur* and BBC’s *Merlin*”

Emilee Ruhland, North Dakota State University

1:30 Fishbowl

- “Presumptive Homosociality and Its Exclusions in—and Beyond—the *Franklin’s Tale*”

Christopher Lozensky, University of South Dakota

- “Satire and Sympathy in Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s *Six Town Eclogues*,”

Sharon Smith, South Dakota State University

2:45 Heritage

- “Purgatory, Patronage, & Contractual Friendship”

Michelle M. Sauer, University of North Dakota

- “The Nature of Identity: Carlyle and Lawrence”

Brooke Nelson, Northern State University

- “Mismatched Pairs: Of Shoes and Sex in Plato and Dekker”

Kevin Andrew Spicer, University of St. Francis

5:30: Plenary Address (Luckasen)

- “Chaucer and the Moving Image in Pre-WWII America”

Lynn Arner, Brock University

Saturday, April 11<sup>th</sup>

9:00 Luckasen

Session Title: Monsters and the Monstrous in Medieval Literature

Organizer: Michael S. Nagy, South Dakota State University

- “*Beowulf*: The Monstrous and the Feminine”

Stefan T. Hall, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

- “Monstrous Faces and Monstrous Places: Rethinking Monsters in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*”

Matthew T. Pullen, South Dakota State University

- “Monstrous Irascibility in the Fornaldarsögur”

Michael S. Nagy, South Dakota State University

10:15 Luckasen

- “Whispers of Desire: Lesbianism in 18th-Century British Literature.”

Kathleen Watson, St. Cloud State University

- “The Scheming Pardoner: Style in Chaucer’s *Pardoner’s Tale*

Nicholas Wallerstein, Black Hills State University

- “To Rectify Man’s Ways to Man: Milton, Hobbes, Locke and the Paradox of Tolerance”

Art Marmorstein, Northern State University

12:15: Workshop1 (Luckasen)

- “In the Classroom: Approaches and Strategies for Teaching Early British Literature”

Panelists: Lizbeth Benkert-Rasmussen, Northern State University; Stephen Hamrick, Minnesota State University Moorhead; David Sprunger, Concordia College; and Bob De Smith, Dordt College (convener).

2:00: Workshop 2 (Luckasen)

- “Class and Gender in the Professoriate”

Presenter: Lynn Arner, Brock University

## Sainted Ann Hutchinson?

Carolyn D. Baker, Mayville State University

*It often happens that the outcasts of one generation are those who are revered as the wisest and best of men by the next. The securest fame is that which comes after a man's death—*The Narrator of Nathaniel Hawthorne's *Grand Father's Chair*

Outside the West Wing of the State House in historic Boston, Massachusetts stands a statue created by Cyrus Dallin. This statue of a woman, the very first of its kind to be displayed publicly outdoors in the City was given by the Anne Hutchinson Memorial Association and State Federation of Women's Club on June 2, 1922. Below the statue there is a plaque which reads: "in memory of Anne Marbury Hutchinson baptized at Alford Lincolnshire England 20-July 1595 killed by the Indians at East Chester New York 1643 courageous exponent of civil liberty and religious toleration" (Anne Marbury Hutchinson).



Fig. 1

Apparently, by 1922 Anne Hutchinson was being publicly portrayed in the United States as a civic saint<sup>1</sup>. And interestingly, nearly one century and a half (1830) before Nathaniel

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<sup>1</sup> According to Eva LaPlante, in 1987 "Michael Dukakis, governor of Massachusetts, formally pardons Anne Hutchinson, 350 years after his predecessor ordered her "banished from our jurisdiction as a woman not fit for our society" (*American Jezebel* 273).

Hawthorne celebrated her in his opening chapter of the *Scarlet Letter*. There in contextual connection with condemned Hester Prynne, Hawthorne associated “sainted Ann Hutchinson” with flowers growing near Prynne’s prison door.<sup>2</sup> Later in the *Scarlet Letter* he would also associate Hutchinson with Prynne and portray her as being “hand in hand with Ann Hutchinson”.<sup>3</sup>

“Sainted Ann Hutchinson”? What a curious description. In 1638 Anne Hutchinson was tried for sedition and heresy and condemned. Even though maternal granddaughter and Hutchinson researcher Eva LaPlante reports how Hutchinson had the support of most colonial merchants and businessmen” living and work in the Bay area (*American Jezebel* 10)<sup>4</sup>, still she was ousted from the Colony in 1638<sup>5</sup>. With these words, John Cotton theologian in chief excommunicated a weakened, expectant mother who would soon

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<sup>2</sup> Hawthorne’s full description is as follows. “This rose bush, by a strange chance, has been kept alive in history; but whether it had survived out of the stern old wilderness, so long after the fall of the gigantic pines and oaks that originally overshadowed it, -- or whether, as there is fair authority for believing, it had sprung up under the footsteps of the *sainted Ann Hutchinson*, (italics mine) as she entered the prison-door—we shall not take upon us to determine. Finding it so directly on the threshold of our narrative, which is now about to issue from that inauspicious portal, one could hardly do otherwise than pluck one of its flowers, and present it to the reader. It may serve, let us hope, to symbolize some sweet moral blossom that may be found along the track, or relieve the darkening close of a tale human frailty and sorrow” (*Scarlet Letter* 37).

<sup>3</sup> The full reference where Hawthorne connects Hutchinson and Hester Prynne reads: “It is remarkable, that persons who speculate the most boldly often conform with the most perfect quietude to the external regulations of society. The thought suffices them, without investing itself in the flesh and blood of action. So it seemed to be with Hester. Yet, had little Pearl never come from the spiritual world, it might have been far otherwise. Then she might have come down to us in history, hand in hand with Ann Hutchinson, as the foundress of a religious sect. She might in one of her phases, have been a prophetess. She might and not improbably would have suffered from the stern tribunals of the period, for attempting to undermine the foundations of the Puritan establishment...” (*Scarlet Letter* 108)

<sup>4</sup> “Hutchinson had many allies such as town assessor, William Colburn; notary, court recorder and surveyor, “the richest man in Boston”, William Coddington; a prominent silk merchant John Coggeshall, innkeeper William Baulston; milliner William Dye; Pequot War Hero Captain John Underhill (LaPlante 8). All of these were threatened with disenfranchisement because of the support they gave to Hutchinson’s brother-in-law John Wheelwright. See in this respect Eva Laplante, *American Jezebel*, page 8.

<sup>5</sup> John Winthrop in his *Journal* mentions how Mr. Wheelwright “and those of his party” found themselves embroiled also in the Antinomian Controversy (Dunn 131-2). Before Anne Hutchinson was defrocked, there were other male leaders who were also disenfranchised: Deputy William Aspinwall and Deputy John Coggeshall.



miscarry a “monstrous” baby shortly thereafter (*Winthrop Journal* 146)<sup>6</sup>.

Forasmuch as yow, M<sup>TM</sup> Huchison, have highly transgressed & offended, & forasmuch as yow have soe many ways *troubled the Church wth yo<sup>r</sup> Erors* & have drawen away many a poor soule, & have *upheld yo<sup>r</sup> Revelations: &* forasmuch as *yow have made a Lye, &c.* Therfor in the name of our Lord Je: Ch: & in the name of the Church I doe not only pronownce yow worthy to be cast owt, but *I doe cast yow out & in the name of Ch. I doe deliver you up to Sathan,* that yow may learne no more to blaspheme, to seduce & to lye, & I doe account yow from this time forth to be a Hethen & a Publican & soe to be held of. (Trial 190)

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<sup>6</sup> A full, scientific, visual description by an attending physician appears in John Winthrop’s *Journal*. The miscarriage is graphically described in this way: “Mrs. Hutchinson, being removed to the Isle of Aquiday in the Naragansett Bay after her time was fulfilled that she expected deliverance of a child, was delivered of a monstrous birth. Hereupon the governor wrote to Mr. Clarke, a physician and a preacher to those of the island, to know the certainty thereof, who returned him this answer: Mrs. Hutchinson, six weeks before her delivery, perceived her body to be greatly distempered and her spirits failing and in that regard doubtful of life, she sent me etc., and not long after (in moderato fluore uterino), it was brought to light, and I was called to see it, where I beheld innumerable distinct bodies in the form of a globe, not much unlike the swims of some fish, so confusedly knit together by so many several strings(which I conceive were the beginnings of veins and nerves) so that it was impossible either to number the small round pieces in every lump, much less to discern from whence every string did fetch its original, they were so snarled one within another. The small globes I likewise opened, and perceived the matter of them(setting aside the membranes in which it was involved) to be partly wind and partly water.....The lumps were twenty-six or twenty seven, distinct and not joined together; there came no secudine after them; six of them were as great as his fist; and the smallest about the bigness of the top of his thumb. The globes were round things, included in the lumps, about the bigness of a small Indian bean, and like the pearl in a man’s eye. The two lumps which differed from the rest were like liver or congealed blood, and had no small globes in them, as the rest had” (Winthrop Journal 146-47).

What Winthrop designates as a “monstrous birth” (146) conforms to what Grand Forks family practice physician Marsha Lange, MD describes as a “molar pregnancy” (sometimes called a “hyatidiform mole“ , tissue which had not yet formed itself into baby (Interview June 19 2013). Reading John Winthrop’s report, she says that this molar pregnancy, which for Hutchinson culminated for in a miscarriage just weeks after the trial, would have been accompanied by intense morning sickness. While the stress of her trial might not have caused the miscarriage, her HLC hormone levels due to her pregnancy would have caused her stress (Lange Interview)..

## Hawthorne's Hutchinson. Pariah? Paragon?

How could Puritan researcher Nathaniel Hawthorne claim sainthood for a woman judged by Puritan history to be a false teacher, liar, blasphemer, Publican, heathen, and seducer? How could he possibly exalt a woman described in his 1835 sketch as one who “bore trouble in her bosom (“Sketch of Anne Hutchinson”)? These qualities do not normally qualify anyone for canonization- in any age, especially early America. Is Hawthorne being inconsistent with his own opinion?

Or, perhaps Hawthorne is simply being ironic? This is the view of Michael Colacurcio who implicitly claims this for Hawthorne's words “the Sainted Anne Hutchinson”. Says he, “Obviously we are being offered a saint's legend in which Hawthorne expects no reader to literally believe” (“Footsteps” 460). But as will be immediately seen, this view does not account for Hawthorne's changing opinions occurring over a twenty year period of time.

Benjamin Franklin IV in his article “Hawthorne's Mrs. Hutchinson” suggests how over time Hawthorne grew in his understanding and appreciation of Hutchinson; and how this evolution occurred in consecutively published works beginning with his 1830 sketch of “Mrs. Anne Hutchinson”, continuing with both his children's story *In Grandfather's Chair* (1841), and his sketch called “Main Street” (1849), and finally culminating with his romantic novel called *The Scarlet Letter* (1850) (“Hawthorne's Mrs. Hutchinson” 96).

According to Franklin, Hawthorne “during his first year as a post-Fanshawe professional author, Hawthorne both a Democrat (capital D) and a romantic, portrays her unsympathetically” in his 1830 sketch (Franklin 94). A few years later in his children's story *In Grandfather's Chair* (1841), he presents Hutchinson as one of the many famous individuals who owned the narrator's favorite chair. This list includes “the minister and outcast Roger Williams, the apostle to the

Indians John Eliot, and the Massachusetts Bay Governor Sir William Phips” (96). Franklin remarks how Hawthorne “tellingly... omits from the list of previous owners the name of John Winthrop, although he figures in the tale as coming to America with Lady Arabella, the original owner of the chair.”(96). In Franklin’s view, then, Hawthorne presents Hutchinson’s defeat as the result of a power hungry patriarchy: “The narrator presents her as a victim as one worthy of our sympathy, if not our respect” (“Hawthorne’s Mrs. Hutchinson” 96).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Franklin is referring to this passage from the *Grand Father’s Chair*.

"Yes," answered Grandfather; "it often happens that the outcasts of one generation are those who are revered as the wisest and best of men by the next. The securest fame is that which comes after a man's death. But let us return to our story. When Roger Williams was banished, he appears to have given the chair to Mrs. Anne Hutchinson. At all events, it was in her possession in 1687. She was a very sharp-witted and well-instructed lady, and was so conscious of her own wisdom and abilities that she thought it a pity that the world should not have the benefit of them. She therefore used to hold lectures in Boston once or twice a week, at which most of the women attended. Mrs. Hutchinson presided at these meetings, sitting with great state and dignity in Grandfather's chair."

"Grandfather, was it positively this very chair?" demanded Clara, laying her hand upon its carved elbow.

"Why not, my dear Clara?" said Grandfather. "Well, Mrs. Hutchinson's lectures soon caused a great disturbance; for the ministers of Boston did not think it safe and proper that a woman should publicly instruct the people in religious doctrines. Moreover, she made the matter worse by declaring that the Rev. Mr. Cotton was the only sincerely pious and holy clergyman in New England. Now, the clergy of those days had quite as much share in the government of the country, though indirectly, as the magistrates themselves; so you may imagine what a host of powerful enemies were raised up against Mrs. Hutchinson. A synod was convened; that is to say, an assemblage of all the ministers in Massachusetts. They declared that there were eighty-two erroneous opinions on religious subjects diffused among the people, and that Mrs. Hutchinson's opinions were of the number."

"If they had eighty-two wrong opinions," observed Charley, "I don't see how they could have any right ones."

"Mrs. Hutchinson had many zealous friends and converts," continued Grandfather. "She was favored by young Henry Vane, who had come over from England a year or two before, and had since been chosen governor of the colony, at the age of twenty-four. But Winthrop and most of the other leading men, as well as the ministers, felt an abhorrence of her doctrines. Thus two opposite parties were formed; and so fierce were the dissensions that it was feared the consequence would be civil war and bloodshed. But Winthrop and the ministers being the most powerful, they disarmed and imprisoned Mrs. Hutchinson's adherents. She, like Roger Williams, was banished."

"Dear Grandfather, did they drive the poor woman into the woods?" exclaimed little Alice, who contrived to feel a human interest even in these discords of polemic divinity.

"They did, my darling," replied Grandfather; "and the end of her life was so sad you must not hear it. At her departure, it appears, from the best authorities, that she gave the great Chair to her friend Henry Vane. He was a young man of wonderful talents and great learning, who had imbibed the religious opinions of the Puritans, and left England with the intention of spending his life in Massachusetts. The people chose him governor; but the controversy about Mrs. Hutchinson, and other troubles, caused him to leave country in 1637. You may read the subsequent events of his life in the History of England." (Whole History of 10-11)

Seemingly, Hawthorne's less than positive understanding of Hutchinson of 1835 evolved from pariah to paragon, and by the time of *The Scarlet Letter* (1850) the quintessential dynamic author Hawthorne was creating and canonizing his dynamic and legendary Hutchinson into civic sainthood. Just how this specific transfiguration demonstrates itself in the *Scarlet Letter* comprises the unique contribution of this essay to the conversation.

So then, what are the shape and the implications of Hawthorne's metamorphosis of Hutchinson as seen in Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*?<sup>8</sup>

Some critics like Sacvan Bercovitch and Lauren Berlant claim Hawthorne is attempting to "to turn a nineteenth century liberal democracy into a secular version of the Puritan's seventeenth century theocracy".<sup>9</sup> Both read *The Scarlet Letter* as a "seventeenth century moment of representation [used as] a means for comment on its antebellum moment of production" ("Scarlet Letter as Civic Myth" 198).

In my way of thinking, though, this posture is way too retrospective. If this were indeed the only way to read *The Scarlet Letter*, as well as its specific Hutchinson references, then why

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<sup>8</sup> Benjamin Franklin the V does not fully explain how this metamorphosis is presented in the *Scarlet Letter*. He only explains theories of why Hawthorne's opinion of Hutchinson probably changed. In his in his short article "Hawthorne's Mrs. Hutchinson", he suggests that "a full reading of the 1830 sketch reveals that the narrator is dissatisfied with Mrs. Hutchinson partly because she is a woman participating in men's work. Franklin says that between 1830 and 1850, the date of *The Scarlet Letter*, Hawthorne spent time at Brook Farm with Margaret Fuller who was a definitely strong woman and [how he] married Sophia Peabody, whom he loved deeply (He also fathered a daughter, Una, on whom he doted.)"

Franklin also notes how Hawthorne later created "emotionally secure and loving women as Elizabeth in "The Minister's Black Veil", Faith in "Young Goodman Brown", and Georgiana in the "Birth Mark", as well as Hester Prynne in *The Scarlet Letter*. He mentions how Hawthorne probably saw "some women as admirable and even morally superior to such tormented fictional men as Reverend Hooper, Goodman Brown, Almer, Dimmesdale, and Chillingworth". He also believes that Hawthorne's association with transcendentalist and an antinomian favoring Emerson in Concord led to his views of the early American Puritans ("Hawthorne's Mrs. Hutchinson" 97)

<sup>9</sup> In endnote 21 of his text Thomas says that Bercovitch's narrative of secularization necessarily minimizes important developments in the eighteenth century, such as the structural transformation of the public sphere and its relation to the rise of a relatively independent civil society. He cites Habermas as agreeing with this view (*Scarlet Letter as Civic Myth* 207)

would Hawthorne admit in *The Custom House* his personal desire to distance himself in some way from that less than golden age?

In a context describing Puritanical intolerances, Hawthorne says:

I know not whether these ancestors of mine bethought themselves to repent, and ask pardon of heaven for their cruelties; or whether they are now groaning under the heavy consequences of them, in another state of being. At all events, I, the present writer, as their representative, hereby take shame upon myself for their sakes, and pray that any curse incurred by them—as I have heard, and as dreary and unprosperous condition of the race, for many a long year back would argue to exist—may be now and henceforth removed. (*Custom House* 12)

Clearly, it seems that Hawthorne has no desire to simply dwell upon the good old days. Rather, he seems oppressed by their memory, and above all wishes that something could be done to “remove the curse incurred by them” (*Custom House* 12). (Maybe Hawthorne’s creation of *The Scarlet Letter* is one attempt to personally absolve himself from the guilt of their curse?) If he perceived *The Scarlet Letter* as being about lessons learned from the past which guide the present and future—if the story is indeed a civic myth—then this seems quite plausible.

Certainly the 17<sup>th</sup> century is intact, operative, and illustrative within the novel. Yet, it seems that Hawthorne repeats the past only as a means of reflecting upon the expanding views of his non-Puritanical 19<sup>th</sup> century world. One might say that Hawthorne looks backward with the distinct notion of bringing his reader forward for the purpose of engaging her active involvement in the social concerns of her 19<sup>th</sup> century world.

This personal stance also seems concordant with Brook Thomas’ descriptions of Michael Gilmore’s views in “Hawthorne and the Making of the Middle Class”, as well as those of Walter

T Herbert in “Dearest Beloved: The Hawthorne’s and Making of the Middle Class” (“Scarlet Letter as Civic Myth” footnote 20). According to Brook Thomas’ read of Gilmore and Herbert, “The Scarlet Letter’s world may be Puritan New England, but ... its major characters have a nineteenth century moral outlook” (“The Scarlet Letter as Civic Myth” 198). This is requires, therefore, one to read *The Scarlet Letter* as a civic myth.

But what exactly is this civic myth?

Thomas constructs his notion of Hawthorne’s civic myth from Rogers Smith’s “exhaustive study of how the law both reflects and helps to produce attitudes towards citizenship in the US”. Thomas embraces Smith’s ideas that “civic myths explain why persons form a people, usually indicating how a political community originated, who is eligible for membership, who is not and why, and what the community’s values and aims are” (*Scarlet Letter as Civic* Thomas 184).

Thomas also shapes this definition by basing it in part on ideas found in an 1834 speech by Rufus Choate. Choate’s speech historically underscores the idea that a “proper literary treatment of the past... mold[s] and fix[es] that final, grand, complex result—the national character”(“Scarlet Letter as Civic Myth” 184). As a result, then, of Smith and Choate’s insights, Thomas then offers his own perception of the civic myth.

Effectively working on/with the myth of the nation’s relation to the Puritan past, *The Scarlet Letter* as civic myth does not advocate obedience to the state or even primary loyalty to the nation. Instead, it illustrates how important it is for liberal democracies to maintain the space of an independent civil society in which alternative obediences and loyalties are allowed a chance to flourish” (“Scarlet Letter as Civic Myth” 185-6).



For the purpose of this essay, then, I will generally proceed in this spirit of Thomas and define civic myth as a newer working of an older story which invites reader engagement with current and felt realities. I will specifically, though, allow for the transformation of Hawthorne's attitude toward Hutchinson; and the way his changed opinion of Hutchinson specifically constructed her into a civic myth. I will promote how his personal metamorphosis of thought invested iconic value in her as seen in *The Scarlet Letter*; for I believe that Hutchinson's example served especially those readers in need of a civic myth, e.g. a lauded, and exonerated (!), exemplar which actively called for their exercise of toleration—religious or otherwise—in a civil society. I believe Hawthorne's transformative construction of Hutchinson into a civic myth, then, creates the insight which causes Hutchinson in hindsight to serve the foresight of all.

So what does this transformation of Hutchinson look like? How does Hawthorne's changed opinion of Hutchinson reflect itself through his narrator of *The Scarlet Letter*? And what purpose might Hawthorne's transformed private image of Hutchinson serve for the development of his reflected public image which comprises her civic myth?

As already demonstrated, Hawthorne's opinion about Hutchinson changed over a period of twenty years (1830-1850). And even though Benjamin Franklin V illustrates Hawthorne's historically changing opinions of Hutchinson as seen in his sketch of "Mrs. Anne Hutchinson", the children's story "Grand Father's Chair", and the sketch "Main Street"; still Franklin does not concentrate on the ways this change was implicitly or explicitly detailed in *The Scarlet Letter*. Since this civic myth of Hutchinson, Hawthorne's most mature conception of her, is integrally tied to his last literary work mentioning her; it seems good to investigate his thought with a close reading of two passages in *The Scarlet Letter*. Of course, these are the two passages where Hutchinson and Prynne are both allied and described.

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Generally speaking, in the first passage, “Chapter I, The Prison Door”, Hawthorne introduces his narrative by *indirectly aligning* Hutchinson and Prynne. Here both lives are intertwined with social shunning and judgment. In this passage of civic judgment, he describes the location of Hester Prynne’s incarceration, a place where allegedly the “sainted Anne Hutchinson” entered as well (*Scarlet Letter* 36-7).

Later, in “Chapter XIII, Another View of Hester”, adulteress Prynne leaves the jail with a baby in her arms and a personally ornamented scarlet letter A on her dress. Hawthorne presents Prynne as “hand in hand with Hutchinson”. Here both are civically judged (104-109). Here both are *directly aligned*. In this context, both lives are intertwined with social redemption and hope. Hawthorne presents Prynne as “hand in hand with Ann Hutchinson” (*The Scarlet Letter* 108) in this chapter, and both get civically redeemed.

As regards these two passages, three specific ideas surface which relate to Hutchinson as a civic myth. These ideas can further grouped into three categories such as: as the *what*, the *how*, and the *purpose* of Hutchinson’s transformation into a civic myth.

Beginning in chapter one, readers can see Hawthorne’s changed opinion of Hutchinson reflected in his narrator’s voice. As mentioned previously, it is probably best to read the words “sainted Ann Hutchinson” as a sincere, rather than an ironic description. There is enough textual evidence documenting Hawthorne’s changed opinion which seems to suggest a reader could safely do this.

But, if as I believe, this statement truly reflects Hawthorne’s change of heart, then what does a reader do with the word “sainted”? Perhaps this word may be where the trouble really begins for a critic like Michael Colacurcio? Certainly, at first glance, it seems to be an act of



sarcasm to bestow saintliness on a woman whom Puritan history judged as a heretic<sup>10</sup>. But this kind of read is not the only one, especially if one notes the immediate, civic context in which the term appears. I would offer that “sainted Ann Hutchinson”, could also be read as civic not theological sainthood in the immediate context of a chapter Hawthorne entitles “The Prison Door”. In this chapter, Hutchinson’s life has no direct, overt theological associations whatsoever<sup>11</sup>.

Here in addition to “congregated sepulchers”, the narrator focuses on Hutchinson’s connection with a prison door which he describes, coincidentally, as the “black flower of *civilized society*” (italics mine) (*The Scarlet Letter* 36). The story also begins with contrastive reference to a stringent, theologically based, Puritanical “stern old wilderness”, the “Utopia of human virtue and goodness”—one which the Puritans “might [only have] originally project[ed]” (*The Scarlet Letter* 36). (And, I might add, this is the same Utopia from which Hawthorne in the *Custom House* wished to distance himself.) Hawthorne’s narrator seems to contrast his more liberating times with those of his former, Puritanical, orthopraxic ones. So much that so that when he uses the words “sweet moral blossom”, he employs them with relationship to a prison

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<sup>10</sup> Ann Hutchinson held the same conservative views as her teacher John Cotton. She was not a heretic, but was abandoned by John Cotton at her trial before the church. See my defense of this position as presented in my paper found in the selected proceedings. Baker, Carolyn. “Anne Hutchinson: Not Guilty!” in Selected Proceedings on the Northern Plains conference on Early British Literature, April 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> 2012 held at Northern State University, Aberdeen South Dakota.

<sup>11</sup> In a Puritan Utopia, theology and the divergent thinking it implied was the original driving impetus for Hutchinson’s trials. In that world, one’s theology and politics were one. For a detailed discussion of how this was the case, see my unpublished essay ““Not Set in the Roome of God”: The New England Puritan Utopia’s Practice of a Transformative Bible Hermeneutic in the Excommunication Trial of Anne Hutchinson”, UND, Grand Forks: May 2013. The Colony Ann Hutchinson shared with John Winthrop was also the direct result of distinct hermeneutical and rhetorical appropriations. For further development of this see my chapter, ““Whose City Is It Anyway?.” *Revisiting the Past Through the Rhetorics of Memory and Amnesia: Selected Papers from the 50th Meeting of the Linguistic Circle of Manitoba*. Ed. Dale and Bruce Maylah and Russel Hirst Sullivan. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010.

house which has for its purpose social reform (*The Scarlet Letter* 37). Therefore, civic not theological sainthood seems the best way to read “sainted Anne Hutchinson”.

Also, Hawthorne’s phrase “Sainted Ann Hutchinson” is not just a civic allusion alone, It has almost magical mystery invested within it—something 17<sup>th</sup> century New England Puritans could have found unacceptable. The rose which “sprung up beneath her feet” magically grows in the prison yard “by strange chance”. The former God of a once Utopic, and monotheistic government also does not appear in this context. Rather, it is the deified “deep heart of nature” that “pities” and is “kind” to the prisoner (*The Scarlet Letter* 36) which does. It is a god of nature and a transcendental mind which undergirds the social context of this chapter.

So it is in this transcendental, non-theological civic milieu that Anne Hutchinson first appears. In this *en meda res* moment of secular, public life, Hawthorne’s narrator introduces Hutchinson’s reason-for-being in the story. Appearing in association with a “rosebush”, her presence along with the unseen prisoner Prynne serves a two-fold purpose. Says Hawthorne:

*Finding it so directly on the threshold of our narrative, which is now about to issue from that inauspicious portal, we could hardly do otherwise than pluck one of its flowers and present it to the reader (italics mine). It may serve, let us hope, to symbolize some sweet moral blossom, that may be found along the track, or relieve the darkening close of a tale of human frailty and sorrow. (The Scarlet Letter 37)*

The above italicized phrase--“The narrative which is now about to issue from that inauspicious portal”—the story of Hester Prynne—is associated here subtly yet definitely, with Hutchinson’s legacy. In fact, seen or unseen, Hutchinson’s example seems to often magically haunt the very shadows of the novel. She seems always present everywhere, even when she is

not. This pariah turned paragon, this public image of Hawthorne's private and fully redeemed Hutchinson seems to serve as an icon offering courage and hope for a social order wrought "with human frailty and sorrow" (*The Scarlet Letter* 37). By tying her canonized civic sainthood to the story of Hester Prynne, Hawthorne empowers both to deliver their subtle yet definite didactics against a dark background.

### The Pathway of the Paragon

So how did Hawthorne's private transfiguration of Hutchinson work its way into *The Scarlet Letter*? The second mention of Ann Hutchinson occurring in chapter thirteen, "Another view of Hester", also offers some hints. Unlike Ann Hutchinson's first appearance in chapter one where she is implicitly allied with a Hester Prynne who is there but not seen, here in chapter thirteen Hutchinson the civic saint is explicitly linked with a Hester Prynne who is both seen and there. Hawthorne writes:

It is remarkable, that persons who speculate the most boldly often conform with the most perfect quietude to the external regulations of society. The thought suffices them, without investing itself in the flesh and blood of action. So it seemed to be with Hester. Yet, had little Pearl never come to her from the spiritual world, it might have been far otherwise. *Then, she might have come down to us in history, hand in hand with Ann Hutchinson, as the foundress of a religious sect. She might, in one of her phases, have been a prophetess. She might, and not improbably would, have suffered death from the stern tribunals of the period, for attempting to undermine the foundations of the Puritan establishment* (italics mine). (*The Scarlet Letter* 108)

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In this passage, Hawthorne's words through his narrator specifically ties the fate of Hester Prynne with that of Ann Hutchinson. For Hawthorne's narrator, Prynne like Hutchinson is likened to a possible "foundress of a religious sect", a "prophetess", or someone who might have "suffered death from the stern tribunals of the period, for attempting to undermine the foundations of the Puritan establishment" (*The Scarlet Letter* 108). For Hawthorne's narrator, the similarities of the two women are striking.

Contextually, it also seems that both Hutchinson and Prynne are similar when it comes to the role of free thinking. There are, after all, eight words or phrases in the short passage of chapter thirteen which in some way reference thinking— e.g. "interpreting", "thought", "decided in the negative and dismissed the point", "a tendency to speculation", "discerns", "fair and suitable position", "dark labyrinth of mind", and especially the phrase "a woman never overcomes these problems by any exercise of thought" (*The Scarlet Letter* 107-08). The linguistic environment alone where Hawthorne connects Hutchinson and Prynne is explicitly marked by thought. Indeed, even the title of the chapter, "Another View of Hester", suggests how Hawthorne's short passage is singularly devoted to a public's way of rethinking Prynne. And of Prynne's free thinking it is also specifically said that, "the world's law was no law for her mind. It was an age in which the human intellect, newly emancipated, had taken a more active and a wider range than for many centuries before" (*The Scarlet Letter* 107).

Textually, then, Hawthorne's narrator presents both Hutchinson and Prynne as free thinkers. But why might he also associate alternative ways of thinking with Hutchinson? Her trial was all about thinking theologically, not civically as Prynne's was? Right? No. Not really.

One could never 'just think theologically' in Hutchinson's Bay Colony, for thinking theologically was strongly also tied to thinking civically. And thinking civically was also tied to

thinking uniformly. Thinking uniformly also got tied to thinking Biblically, or rather, what New England Puritan interpreters determined this to be. As demonstrated in my essay ““Not Set in the Roome of God’: The New England Puritan Utopia’s Practice of a Transformative Bible Hermeneutic in the Excommunication Trial of Anne Hutchinson”, for the Colony’s Puritans,

The law [was] no longer merely a law for the ancient Faithful living beneath different conditions in a different time and place. Rather, the Law as transfigured by the Colony [was] “the rule of life”, i.e. the civic laws for the young theocracy. Hutchinson’s probable understanding of the Law as a personal, spiritual, inward, not judicial reality—the way early Pauline Christian communities most likely would have understood it— also prove[d] problematic for the colonists. To believe a citizen [wa] not bound to the theocratically altered meaning of the ancient Jewish law—“not being bound to the Law, no Transgression of the Law is sinful” (*Trial* 174) — [was] dangerous. Such belief also [had] implications for law enforcement in the young, burgeoning, theocracy. Anyone like Hutchinson expressing “divers opinions” (*Trial* 174) about a reconfigured idea of law potentially encourage[d] social upheaval in a theocracy. In her Colony, all [were] believe, think, and do the same thing in order to be considered law abiding. (Baker 12-13)

Hutchinson’s greatest error, therefore, was her theology, i.e. her divergent thinking which went against the convergent, mandated thinking of her day. Like Hutchinson’s association with the antinomian controversy that led to her banishment, likewise for Prynne: “The world’s law was no law for her mind”, either (*The Scarlet Letter* 107). Indeed, the prophetic actions of

Hutchinson manifested by her willingness to free think would be fulfilled by Prynne in her own day: "... an age in which the human intellect, newly emancipated, had taken a more active and wider range than for many centuries before" (*The Scarlet Letter* 107). In a very real way, Hutchinson's free thinking earned her an A of abandonment when she challenged her generation's notions with what she truly perceived as the True Ancient Principle. Later, her similar letter would set in place the conditions for an emboldened Prynne to think her own thoughts, and to "overthrow and rearrange the most real abode—the whole system of ancient prejudice, wherewith was linked much of ancient principle" (*The Scarlet Letter* 107).

Just like her ancient predecessor Hutchinson, Prynne "imbibed this spirit" (*Scarlet Letter* 107). Both "assumed a freedom of speculation, then common to the other side of the Atlantic, but which our forefathers had they known it would have held to be a deadlier crime than that stigmatized by the scarlet letter" (*The Scarlet Letter* 107).<sup>12</sup>

## The Purpose of the Paragon

This essay has explored the *what* as well as the *how* of Hawthorne's linking Hutchinson and Prynne. But it has yet to discuss what creative and civic *purposes* this alliance might have achieved. Textually, it seems that the very purpose of their civic alliance is suggested by Hawthorne's narrator in chapter one.

Finding it so directly on the threshold of our narrative, which is now about to issue from that inauspicious portal, we could hardly do otherwise than pluck one of its flowers and present it to the reader. *It may serve, let us hope, to symbolize some sweet moral blossom, that may be found along the track, or relieve the*

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<sup>12</sup> Editor Leland S. Person suggests an alternative reading which places this not in the time of the Bay Colony but that of King Charles I. "Hawthorne is probably referring to the English Civil war, whose dates parallel those of the novel. By May 1649, King Charles I had been overthrown and beheaded (in January 1649). Hawthorne invites us to see Hester as an American version of such British revolutionaries as Oliver Cromwell (*The Scarlet Letter and Other Writings*, footnote 1, page 107).

*darkening close of a tale of human frailty and sorrow (Italics mine). (The Scarlet Letter, 37)*

As inspired by the above italicized words, the story of Prynne and the Hutchinson who inspired it, is civically not theologically redemptive. For Prynne, and as will soon be seen for Hutchinson, there would be life after the A. The A was not an end. It was, in fact, an unexpected new start, a genesis in a new public appreciation of a true civic duty, a re-visioning of a person who did just this. Even though, according to Hawthorne's narrator, the scarlet letter might not have "done its office" (*Scarlet Letter* 109) for Prynne, still and even more importantly, it did something else.

Prynne's choice of Mr. Dimmesdale in place of a missing husband she deduced as dead certainly had its consequences. A "monstrous child" was born<sup>13</sup>. Prynne's Pearl, became "the iron link of mutual crime, which neither he nor she could break. Like all other ties, it brought along with it its obligations" (*The Scarlet Letter* 104). Yet Prynne would come to endure her community's derision for that choice without "irritation" or "irksomeness"; and she would live quietly as one who "never battled with the public, but submitted uncomplainingly to its worst usage". She would not demand its favors. She would make "no claim upon it, in requital for what she suffered. She would not "weigh upon its sympathies" (*The Scarlet Letter* 104).

In fact, as she lived her pariah existence in community with others, she did it with a difference, and the "blameless purity of her life, during all these years in which she had been set apart to infamy, was reckoned largely in her favor". Having lost everything associated with public acceptance meant she would eventually gain something else. "With nothing now to lose, in the sight of mankind, and with no hope, and seemingly no wish, of gaining anything, it could

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<sup>13</sup> See footnote six. John Winthrop used similar language to describe Anne Hutchinson's "monstrous birth". The New England Puritans of Hutchinson's time believed that such events as monstrous births were signs of divine judgment, or that the child has been conceived in wrongful ways.

only be a genuine regard for virtue that had brought back the poor wanderer to its paths. (*The Scarlet Letter* 105)

Though she experienced something worse than virtual banishment from society by actually having to live there, “Hester never put forward even the humblest title to share in the world's privileges, . . . than to breathe the common air, and earn daily bread for little Pearl and herself by the faithful labor of her hands” (*The Scarlet Letter* 105).

Her desire to be a civic good for others also blossomed: “. . . She was quick to acknowledge her sisterhood with the race of man, whenever benefits were to be conferred. None so ready as she to give of her little substance to every demand of poverty.” Even while her efforts to help others were not always appreciated by “the bitter-hearted pauper [who] threw back a gibe in requital of the food brought regularly to his door”. Yet, there was “none so self-devoted as Hester” for “in all seasons of calamity, indeed, whether general or of individuals, the outcast of society at once found her place” (*The Scarlet Letter* 105).

Yes, in the end, for Prynne there would be life after the A, and strangely a life because of it. Her civic exclusion actually empowered her greatest social contribution. She would come “not as a guest, but as a rightful inmate, into the household that was darkened by trouble; as if its gloomy twilight were a medium in which she was entitled to hold intercourse with her fellow-creatures.” By so doing she would become a “self-ordained a Sister of Mercy”; someone “ordained” by the “the world's heavy hand”, ordained “when neither the world nor she looked forward to this result” (*The Scarlet Letter* 105).

In the end, her letter would come to symbolize both her social redemption and civic service: “the symbol of her calling”, so much so that “. . . many people [would refuse] to interpret the scarlet A by its original signification. [They would say] that it meant Able . . . so strong was



Hester Prynne, with a woman's strength (*The Scarlet Letter* 105-06). And just as Prynne's civic service would lead to her public re-visioning, so also would Hutchinson's. I believe, too, that for Hutchinson there was life after her A.

Hawthorne in his sketch "Mrs. Hutchinson" relates how after one month of official banishment, Hutchinson travelled with her family to Rhode Island "an accustomed refuge for the exiles of Massachusetts, in all seasons of persecution"; and how that according to John Winthrop, "her enemies believed that the anger of Heaven was following her" (*Mrs. Hutchinson*).

Like Prynne, Hutchinson accepted her community's derision without "irritation" or "irksomeness". Hutchinson left her Colony within one month of being asked, but not before she delivered her self-defense in the spirit of self-assured meekness and teachability.<sup>14</sup> She left for Rhode Island, and like Prynne began life again as a single mother. For after a "little time" in Rhode Island she "lost her husband". In a short time, sycophantism annoyed her sense of humility. She grew "uneasy among the Rhode-Island colonists, whose liberality towards her, at an era when liberality was not esteemed a Christian virtue." According to Hawthorne, this probably "arose from a comparative insolicitude on religious matters." Apparently, she found this "more distasteful... than even the uncompromising narrowness of the Puritans ("Mrs. Hutchinson"). And so she left and departed for New Amsterdam.

In New Amsterdam (modern Long Island, New York City) Hutchinson, like predecessor Prynne became "a self-ordained Sister of Mercy" (*The Scarlet Letter* 105) to all, even as she served her family of sixteen ("Mrs. Hutchinson"). "Having felled the trees of a virgin soil, *she*

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<sup>14</sup> See the many occasions where Anne Hutchinson demonstrated her teach ability by apologizing to her accusers for any misunderstandings she may have caused. See "Trial of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson" recorded in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Second Series, Vol. 4, [Vol. 24] (1887 - 1889), pp. 158-198.

*became herself the virtual head, civil and ecclesiastical, of a little colony* (Italics mine)” (“Mrs. Hutchinson”). In the end Hawthorne also admitted how:

*She found the repose, hitherto so vainly sought* (italics mine). Secluded from all whose faith she could not govern, *surrounded by the dependents over whom she held an unlimited influence* (italics mine), agitated by none of the tumultuous billows which were left swelling behind her, we may suppose, that, in the stillness of Nature, her heart was stilled. (“Mrs. Hutchinson”)

Certainly, “neither the world nor [Hutchinson] looked forward to this result” (*The Scarlet Letter* 105).

Like Prynne, Hutchinson in spite of-- and because of-- her A eventually enjoyed a life of “repose” by leading and serving the common good of a community over whom she had “unlimited influence” before the “awful close” of her “impressive story”<sup>15</sup>

In closing, one might read Hawthorne’s sketch drawn in part from John Winthrop’s diaries, concluding that while “the office of the Scarlet letter did not do its part” of final judgment on Hester Prynne; the office of the scarlet letter *did* in fact “do its part” in its final social damnation of Hutchinson. But this is not necessarily so.

Like Prynne, it did not do its office. It did something else. Later, in 1922, seventy-two years after *The Scarlet Letter* (1850) there were others like Hawthorne who also refused to interpret Hutchinson’s exile by its originally intended signification. As evidenced by Cyrus

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<sup>15</sup> Hawthorne relates her tragic end:” The savage foe was on the watch for blood. Sixteen persons assembled at the evening prayer; in the deep midnight, their cry rang through the forest; and daylight dawned upon the lifeless clay of all but one. It was a circumstance not to be unnoticed by our stern ancestors, in considering the fate of her who had so troubled their religion, that an infant daughter, the sole survivor amid the terrible destruction of her mother's household, was bred in a barbarous faith, and never learned the way to the Christian's Heaven. Yet we will hope, that there the mother and the child have met. (“Mrs. Hutchinson”)

Dallin's 1922 statue of Hutchinson situated today not far from where John F. Kennedy's, many people also reinterpret Hutchinson's banishment as "the symbol of her calling". Today in many minds, she still exerts the iconic value of a "courageous exponent of civil liberty and religious toleration" (Anne Marbury Hutchinson). She is a civic saint whose many followers admire or embody her perennial values.

Today "sainted Ann Hutchinson" is an "able" and "strong" civic saint who "hand in hand" with Prynne demonstrates even yet a "woman's strength" (*The Scarlet Letter* 105).

### **Questions for Further Research**

Where and how do other writers, early American and otherwise, provide evidence for similar changes of opinion regarding Hutchinson?

Who are the specific persons or groups of Hawthorne's time who might have needed Hutchinson's example to inspire them in their own socially redemptive efforts? Is her name associated in other writings with any specific social causes?

In what ways did Roger Williams Rhode Island serve as a refugee camp for other persecuted Puritans like Hutchinson of New England?

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# The Image of the Astrologer in English Literature, 1600-1740

William B. Branson, St. Cloud State

## Introduction

This work-in-progress is an exploration of the image of the astrologer in English literature between 1600 and 1740. I will focus mostly on satires, both in plays and poetry. Some non-literary texts will be included in order to provide a context for the literature. These sources provide evidence for the following contention:

*Astrologers are almost always portrayed as frauds and cheaters. At the beginning of this period, gentlemen were among their victims. At the end of this period, gentlemen were not. This change is tied to shifts in the definition of the gentlemen, partly in opposition to elite women, the urban merchants, the urban poor, and rustics.*

The major theme of this essay is the question of perception. Gentlemen, throughout the period, are understood to be knowing. They see through certain types of frauds and deceptions. Before the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, astrology was a borderline case with respect to this type of gentlemanly perception: some gentlemen, in regards to some types of astrology, were fooled. From about 1662 (the publication of *Hudibras*) to about 1708 (the publication of *The Bickerstaff Papers*), astrology moved off the border: seeing through the schemes of astrologers became a minor part of the gentlemanly identity.

This focus on an aspect of the identity of elite men from about 1660 to about 1710 entails investigating those against whom elite men define themselves. If gentlemen are not taken in by astrologers, then those who are taken in by astrologers are not gentlemen. Women, rustics, the urban poor, merchants: all these are categories of people against whom the gentlemanly identity was defined, with the latter three categories largely gendered as male. Alongside the shift in

gentlemanly perception of astrology, then, is a corresponding shift in how these groups interact with astrology.

Of these four groups, the urban poor serve as the pool from whom astrologers come. Astrologers are cheats and deceivers, and such criminals bubble up from the urban underclass, in the mind of the seventeenth century writer. Most astrologers are presented as poor, urban men, out to swindle people. Should gentlemen engage in astrological deception, they do so only reluctantly, and only with the best of intentions.

Many of the writers referred to below are writing mostly for the urban elite male audience. The urban part sits in opposition to the rustics; the elite part sits in opposition to merchants. Rustics are unsophisticated—they are easy prey for the sharpers of the London underworld. Merchants are avaricious—their greed leads them into the traps of the astrologer. These two categories represent the negation of two essential aspects of the gentlemanly identity: sophistication and disinterest. Unlike the rustic, the gentleman is knowing in the ways of the world, and in particular in the ways of the London underclass; he does not fall for their tricks. Unlike the merchant, the gentleman does not have a compelling interest in money, or indeed in anything. The proper gentleman is disinterested, able to view all things with a mind unweighted in any particular direction. These two traits—sophistication and disinterest—combine to create an image of the gentleman as someone who is wise to the psychology of others and who is balanced in his own psychology.

The three categories of rustics, merchants, and urban poor are largely gendered as male, although there are women within these categories. Gentlemen are not women, but in particular, they are not elite women. Gentlemen have to be distinguished from the women who otherwise would be their peers. In terms of astrology, elite women are susceptible to the traps of the



astrologer due to the uncontrollable passions of women, in particular those of curiosity and lust. These passions often overwhelm the right working of the mind of women, leading them to grasp at the bait offered by astrologers. This susceptibility to the passions is a feature of all women, but it is a characteristic that separates elite men from elite women. People who are both women and urban poor can be depicted in literature as differing from gentlemen in more than one way; elite women in literature are distinguished (at least in regard to astrology) by the interest generated by their passions.

My aim, in this essay, is to examine texts in terms of the conceptions about gentlemen above, keeping in mind that these conceptions are themselves changing over time. The Restoration of Charles II brought the questions of deception and knowing into sharp relief, especially in regards to religion. I believe that interest, in particular, becomes, between 1660 and 1710, a much more important index of gentlemanly behavior than previously. Gentlemen are increasingly seen as disinterested; the groups against whom gentlemen are defined are increasingly seen as interested, and this change can be seen in texts involving astrologers. This analytic framework is as of yet tentative—this is a work in progress, and I hope to deepen the analysis in future works. This essay provides a look at astrologers in literature, and tries to suggest that these works can form a grounding for the analysis suggested above.

### The Basics of Renaissance Astrology

Before delving into the texts, a little background on astrology is in order. For this brief description, I draw mostly on Westman. As a Renaissance art, astrology was tied to the theory of humors. Each planet was associated with a humor, and its position in the sky affected the humors within our own bodies. This linkage between the heavens and our bodies was the philosophical ground for astrology, and was widely accepted.

Astrology traditionally had four parts, not always well-distinguished. They were natural astrology, medical astrology, interrogatory astrology, and judicial astrology. A major focus of natural astrology was agricultural practice—should beans be planted with waxing or the waning of the moon, for example. As such, natural astrology was rooted partially in the philosophical concepts of the interaction of the stars and the plants of the earth, but rooted deeper in folklore and popular culture. Medical astrology was the specific application of the theory of humors to the progress of diseases. The position of the stars influenced the humors within our bodies, as mentioned above, and so influenced the course of diseases, which were conceived of as imbalances in the bodily humors.

Interrogatory and judicial astrology are tangled together, and together they form the art of prognostication. Interrogatory astrology was the art of divining an answer to a question, based on the position of the stars at the moment the question is asked. This aspect of astrology was often depicted as a scam within the texts of the 17th century, with Samuel Butler, as we shall see, even going so far as to connect it with a vast criminal conspiracy. Judicial astrology concerned long term predictions about individuals, peoples, cities, and states. For individuals, these predictions were based on horoscopes that depict the positions of the stars at the birth of the individual. Some cities had specific dates of foundation, for which a horoscope could be created, but more often the fates of cities, states, and peoples were tied to eclipses, which disrupt the regular procession of the influence of the stars.

The texts that I will present in this essay address mostly judicial and interrogatory astrology, which are, in a sense, a little looser than either natural astrology, which is hedged in by folklore, or medical astrology, which is taught in universities and practiced by physicians. Judicial and interrogatory astrology were practiced by a wide range of people, and addressed a much wider

range of social concerns than did natural or medical astrology. This left judicial and interrogatory astrology open to charges of deception and fraud.

*The Alchemist* and other texts from before the Restoration

*The Alchemist* of 1610 is a complicated play, as Jonson is presenting a satire on avarice and how it affects almost the entire society, from a druggist to a knight. The plot of the play is fairly simple: a butler (Face) is left in charge of the mansion when his employer (Lovewit) leaves town to avoid the plague. He comes across a down-on-his-luck alchemist (Subtle) and a prostitute (Doll Common). The three set up in the mansion, to scam as much as they can before Lovewit comes back. Comedy and satire ensues. Alchemy and astrology are closely related in the early 17th century, and our alchemist Subtle also practices astrology. The character of Subtle draws our attention, because he is, in a sense, very typical of the presentation of astrologers. He is a scam artist, drawn from the dregs of society; in Act 1, Scene 1, Face describes how he found Subtle:

at Pie-corner,  
Taking your meal of steam in, from cooks' stalls,  
Where, like the father of hunger, you did walk  
Piteously costive, with your pinch'd-horn-nose,  
And your complexion of the Roman wash,  
Stuck full of black and melancholic worms,  
Like powder corns shot at the artillery-yard.  
...  
When all your alchemy, and your algebra,  
Your minerals, vegetals, and animals,

Your conjuring, cozening, and your dozen of trades,  
Could not relieve your corps with so much linen  
Would make you tinder, but to see a fire; (Jonson 607)

This presentation of Subtle is a running theme throughout the entire period, from 1603 to 1740. Astrologers are usually drawn from the dregs of society. They are scammers, and so fit into a particular schema of London society. The urban poor of London are viewed as criminals by many, including playwrights like Jonson (Loxley, 8). Jonson started life as a bricklayer, which is several steps up from the world that Subtle lived in. London had changed rapidly in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, with a flood of immigrants from the countryside coming to London to find work and sustenance. Many of these people ended up without steady jobs, and an underclass of scammers came into an existence. These are the people from whom the character of the astrologer is usually drawn.

In this play, Jonson seeks to demonstrate the universality of the corrupting effects of avarice, and so the gulls of the sharps Face, Subtle, and Doll Common are drawn from all aspects of society. There is a druggist, a young law clerk, a young buck and his sister, a pair of Puritans, and a gentleman, Sir Epicure Mammon, with his gambler sidekick Surly Pertinax. Two questions arise here. First, would the audience accept Sir Epicure Mammon as a gentleman? Second, how does Mammon's gullibility with respect to alchemy and astrology interact with conceptions of the gentleman? (And I thank Bruce Brandt for his questions on this point at the conference; they helped clarify my thinking.)

I think the answer to the first question is yes. Mammon is clearly not an ideal gentleman, but Jonson's satiric purpose would not have worked had the audience rejected him as a gentleman. Mammon functions in the play as showing that being a gentleman did not make

people immune from the corrupting influence of avarice. In Act 2, Scene 1 (Jonson 618-619), Epicure Mammon comes on stage with Pertinax Surly, and Mammon waxes enthusiastic about what he will accomplish with the stone that Subtle is preparing for him. Mammon's dreams, unlike the dreams of any of the others, are expansive: he will use his stone "to purchase Devonshire and Cornwall, And make them perfect Indies!" and "I'll undertake, withal, to fright the plague Out of the kingdom in three months." His dreams are the glorious dreams of the gentleman, a dream to transform the world, as well as himself. He is a gentleman gull for the astrologer Subtle, and would be accepted as both gentleman and gull by the audiences of the times.

This two-fold identification of Sir Epicure Mammon, as gentleman and gull, tells us something about the status of astrology in relation to the gentlemanly identity of the early seventeenth century. Astrology was an accepted part of the understanding of the world, even by gentlemen. That astrology (and alchemy, its associated art) could be used by the unscrupulous to scam people was also accepted. For gentlemen, then, astrology itself was not something that would trigger disbelief; that Subtle is a false astrologer does not mean that there are not true astrologers. Sir Epicure Mammon's avarice does blind him to the scams of Subtle, Face, and Doll Common, but that does not mean that astrology and alchemy were, at this time, things that gentlemen ought to automatically reject.

A similar text is Thomas Tomkis' *Albumazar*, first performed in 1615. The plot centers around two old gentlemen, Antonio and Pandolfo, who have agreed to marry each other's daughters. Antonio goes on a trip, and doesn't return in time for the ceremony. The astrologer Albumazar opens the play with a paean to astrology as the best of thievery, speaking to his fellow thieves. In Act 1, Scene 1, lines 65-69, he describes his upcoming victim (Pandolfo) as

Tis a rich Gentleman, as old as foolish.  
The poore remnant of whose brain that age had left him  
The doting love of a young Girle hath dried:  
And which concerns us most, he gives firme credit  
To Necromancie and Astrologie.

Pandolfo, like Sir Epicure Mammon, is clearly depicted as a gentleman but as a gentleman with a particular fault—in this case, lust. This fault will open him up to the scam of the astrologer and his coterie of thieves, but his belief in astrology is separate from this fault. Tomkis' play, like Jonson's, suggests that astrology can be a tool for scam artists, but I think that belief in astrology itself is not taken as being ungentlemanly.

A third text is John Mason's *The Turke*, of 1610. There is no astrologer character in this tragedy, but astrology does enter the play as an occurrence that triggers some of the action. In Act 2, Scene 1, the servant Eunuchus enters the chamber of the Turk Muleasses, and says that "A tumult 'mongst the fearefull multitude, Causd by an ominous terrour in the heauens" has caused Borgia, the ruler of Florence, to send Eunuchus to summon Muleasses to Borgia's presence. Muleasses then rejoices in the eclipse (lines 40-53):

Muleasses: Make that eclipse eternall Mahomet.  
Rise, rise ye mistie-footed Iades of night,  
Draw your darke mistresse with her sable vayle,  
Like a blacke Negro in an Ebone chaire,  
Athwart the worlds eie: from your foggy breaths  
Hurle an Egiptian grossenes through the ayre,  
That none may see my plots: Hast any greater newes?

Eunuchus: The daies eyes out, a thousand little starres  
Spread like so many torches, about the skye,  
Make the world shew like Churches hung with blacke,  
And set with tapers at some funerall:  
Amongst these starres directly from the East,  
A firy meteor points a burning rod  
At Florence.

The responses of everyone in the play, including the powerful Turk Muleasses and the various rulers of Florence, Venice, and Ferrara, to the astrological symbolism is to accept them as real indications from the heavens. There is no questioning about these astrological symbols, nor is there any sense that the audience themselves would have any qualms about accepting these signs in the skies. The gentlemen in the play and the gentlemen watching the play accepted this as part of their world view.

Among other, non-literary texts, we see the same thing. Astrology is for gentlemen, as it is for everyone. William Woodhouse's *Almanacke* for 1602 has the following on its title page:

“Necessary for all men, chiefly gentlemen, lawyers, merchants, mariners,  
husbandmen, travelers, artificers, and all others.”

Woodhouse specifically mentions gentlemen among the list of men who would find his writings useful. This statement is included on his almanacs of 1604, 1606, 1607, and 1608 (in part, I believe, because they used the same plates). His almanacs included a calendar, including the location of the moon, a brief prognostication concerning the eclipses of the year, with his warnings mostly having to do with diseases, and then segues into a monthly description of the weather. This is followed by a list of the fairs of England. These are things that a gentlemen

(and certainly merchants, mariners, and travelers) would want to know, but there is nothing particularly aimed at gentlemen. They are merely included amongst the “all men” who would find his almanac useful.

Finally, we have the following passage from King James’ *Demonologie*, which is a dialogue between Epistemon and Philomathis:

“Epistemon: The other is called *Astrologia*, being compounded of “astro” and “logos”, which is to say, the the word and preaching of the Starres: Which is divided into two parts: The first, by knowing thereby the powers of simples and sicknesses, the course of the seasons and the weather, being ruled by their influence, which part depeinding upon the former, although it bee not of it self a part of *Mathematiques*: yet it is no unlawfull, being moderately used, suppose not so necessarie and commendable as the former [astronomy]. The second part is to trust so much to their influences, as thereby to foretell what common-weales shall flourish or decay: what persons shall be fortunate or unfortunate: what side shall winne in any battell: what man shal obtaine victorie at singular comabte: what way, and of what aage shal men die: what horse shall winne at match-running: and divers such like incredible things, wherein *Cardanus*, *Cornelius Agrippa*, and divers others have more curiously than profitably written at large. Of this roote last spoken of, springs innumerable branches; such as the knowledge by the nativities; the *Cheironomie*, *Geomancie*, *Hydromancie*, *Arithmancie*, *Physiognomie*, and a thousand others, which were much practice, and holden in great reverence by the Gentiles of old: And this last part of *Astrologie* whereof I have spoken, which is the root of their branches, was called by them pars



fortuna. This part now is utterly unlawfull to be trusted in, or practiced amongst Christians, as leaning to no ground of natural reason: and it is this part which I called before the Devils schoole.

Philomathis. But yet many of the learned are of the contrarie opinion.” (Stuart 100-101)

King James sums up the state of astrology in the early 17th century. Natural and medical astrology were lawful. Judicial and interrogatory astrology were, in James’ eyes, not lawful, but, as Philomathis notes, “many of the learned are of the contrary opinion.” Astrology could be a tool used to bilk people out of their money, but that it could be used as such did not rule it out of bounds for gentlemen.

#### From 1620 to 1660

These years saw quite a lot happen in England. For astrology, the major event was the lapsing of printing controls in the 1640s; almanacs, which had been tightly controlled by the Stationer’s Company, multiplied. Capp (1979) argues that almanacs served as an essential part of the popular press between 1640 and 1660. They printed political and religious arguments, presented entertaining tales of distant lands, provided useful information about the dates of fairs and the schedule of tides and the phases of the moon, and they provided predictions and prognostications about the future. Almanacs were not purely astrological texts. During the 1650s, most of the almanac-makers who remained in England were supporters of Parliament and Cromwell; the royalist almanacs writers wrote from France. The predictions made within almanacs were colored by the political leanings of the writer, and these leanings were not hard to discern.

The Restoration of 1660 was a tricky political affair. Charles II did not return as a conquering monarch but was invited back. He faced a nation divided into a number of mutually hostile factions and had to find a way to keep the nation united. In this fractious polity, Shapin (1994) locates a particular conception of science, one based on the identity of the gentleman. Robert Boyle and the new Royal Society took the idea of the disinterested gentleman and made that the foundation of their new science. The disinterested gentleman could observe things as they actually happened, and then report accurately what he had seen. Because the gentleman had no interests that would motivate passions to intervene with either his observations or his reporting, he, and his reports, could be trusted. This particular aspect of the gentleman, I think, becomes entangled with astrology. I think that, over the fifty years between *Hudibras* and *The Bickerstaff Papers*, the character of the disinterested gentleman came to include a particular stance towards astrology: a disinterested observer of astrology would come to the conclusion that it is untrustworthy. The process by which this happened was not a consistent move forward; there were starts and stops. The overall trend, however, was to remove astrology from the mind-set of the proper gentleman.

#### Samuel Butler's *Hudibras*.

Samuel Butler's *Hudibras* was an extremely influential poem, and it came out in three pieces. The first Part was published in 1661 and was immediately embraced. Butler produced the second Part in 1662 and the third fifteen years later in 1677. The second Part is the one that concerns me, since it includes the encounter between the knight Hudibras and the astrologer Sidrophel. In keeping with the theme of this paper, I want to restrict my attention to deception and disinterest, and in particular, to whether or not Hudibras would be seen by readers as a gentleman being deceived by an astrologer. Of course, the problem with such a restriction is that

it is no restriction at all—the entire poem is about deception. Thus, I will start the discussion of Sidrophel the astrologer by looking at Butler’s concerns about deception at large, and then by examining how these work out in the incident of Sidrophel and Hudibras. Finally, I will return to the issue of deception-by-astrologer, and how (and whether) this incident fits the larger thesis.

There are two particular readings of *Hudibras* that I draw on here, that of George Wasserman (1989) and that of Ashley Marshall (2008). They are complementary, but address *Hudibras* from different standpoints. Wasserman is more philosophical, engaging with Butler’s views on epistemology and human behavior. Marshall is more political, connecting the poem to the political culture of 1660-1662. Unfortunately, neither addresses the encounter with Sidrophel in any great detail.

Wasserman argues that Butler saw the people of the world divided into three class: the ignorant, the knaves, and the fools. This division is tied to Butler’s view of human reason, which he saw as a consequence of the Fall from Eden. God’s grant of reason is a two-edged sword, for Butler: reason can help guide us through this world, but it can easily be used to lead us astray. Fools are perhaps the most innocent category of people: these are those who have lost their reason or never had reason. They are closer to the beasts than other humans, but they are also closer to Adam in his innocence. Knaves and the ignorant have reason, but few people use it well. Knaves use reason to deceive others; the ignorant are readily deceived by knaves and by themselves. The two main characters in the poem are the Presbyterian knight Hudibras and his Independent squire Ralph. Wasserman argues that Hudibras is ignorant, while Ralph is a knave. This view works well to explain some of what happens during the incident with Sidrophel.

Marshall argues that Butler was writing during a very particular political crises, that of how the Church of England should be reconstituted, now that Charles II was on the throne. She argues that Butler wanted a restoration of the episcopal church, and an exclusion of non-conformists, including both Presbyterians and Independents. At the time, the Independents were the more extreme group; some moderate episcopalian Anglicans were willing to negotiate with the more moderate Presbyterians. A complicating factor was the Catholic tilt of Charles II and his court, returning from their time in France. Charles II himself would have preferred a broad tolerance, one that was similar to the political settlement of the Act of Oblivion and Indemnity. A tolerance that extended to Independents would also extend to Catholics, which was a major sticking point. In 1662, the Act of Uniformity excluded Catholics, Presbyterians, and Independents. Marshall locates *Hudibras* within this political and religious argument.

An important aspect of *Hudibras* and its interaction with this context is the chronology of the writing of the poem. Parts of it were written in the 1650s, and some argue even in the 1640s. Marshall argues that the poem was re-written and edited in the early 1660s, between the Restoration in 1660 and the publication in 1661 and 1662. The chronology of the incident with Sidrophel has been established by Curtiss (1929). He suggests that there are two parts to the Sidrophel passage. The first was probably written in the 1650s, and the character of Sidrophel was based loosely on the Parliamentary astrologer William Lilly. The second part was probably written in the early 1660s, and Butler's revised Sidrophel was based loosely on members of the Royal Society, in particular Paul Neile. These two aspects of Sidrophel sit uneasily next to each other, because it seems to me (and to Curtiss) that Butler never truly harmonized the two pieces before publication. Parts of the Sidrophel passage are pointed satires of astrologers; parts are pointed satires of the new *virtuosi* of the Royal Society.

Throughout the passage concerning Sidrophel, the following have to be kept in mind. Butler, as Marshall suggests, is interested in tying the more moderate Presbyterians to the more extreme Independents. In the poem, this works out as the knave Ralph presenting arguments to the ignorant Hudibras. One of the marks of the ignorant, in Wasserman's interpretation of Butler, is that they use reason incorrectly; they use reason to construct arguments to deceive themselves that following their self-interest is in fact just. And one of the most stubborn of people is an ignorant one, convinced of the truth of their own folly. Hudibras asks Ralph:

Quoth Hudibras, This Sidrophel  
I've heard of, and should like it well,  
If thou canst prove the Saints have freedom,  
To go to Sorc'ers when they need 'em. (Butler 155)

Hudibras cues Ralph as to what Hudibras would like to do; Ralph is ready to supply an argument:

Those Principles I quoted late,  
Prove that the Godly may alledge  
For any thing their Priviledge;  
And to the Dev'l himself may go,  
If they have motives thereunto.  
For as there is a War between  
The Dev'l and them, it is no Sin,  
If they, by subtle Stratagem,  
Make use of him, as he does them. (155)

Ralph-the-knave provides an argument justifying the action that Hudibras-the-ignorant wants to take, and so Hudibras takes hold of the argument and internalizes it (which becomes important later). The reason Hudibras wants to see Sidrophel is to find out if Hudibras will be able to marry the Widow, for he has sworn an oath to her, one that he does not want to carry out. If Sidrophel shows him that the Widow will not marry him, then Hudibras will break his oath. This marks Hudibras to the readers of the time as being not-a-gentleman. As Marshall puts it (640), “Hudibras, the Presbyterian knight, is a laughingstock, glorious in neither appearance nor aptitude.” This is in sharp contrast to Sir Epicure Mammon, who readers and audiences would consider a gentleman, albeit a very flawed one. Hudibras wears many masks that hide the inner man, and one of them is knighthood. Wasserman argues that Butler thinks of words as clothing, as ways to mask and to conceal truth. Hudibras’ verbal concern for his honor (he uses the word quite a lot) contrasts sharply with this move to break his oath. This interchange between Hudibras and Ralph plays into the political aspects highlighted by Marshall, that the Independents are untrustworthy and have influence over the Presbyterians.

The question of deception in the encounter between Hudibras and Ralph, and Sidrophel and his assistant Whachum, is a complicated one. There are multiple layers of deception, and the resolution is through violence. It is not as simple as just a deception by an astrologer. Again, to set the scene, Hudibras-the-ignorant, having deluded himself with the aid of Ralph-the-knave, seeks Sidrophel in order to determine if Hudibras will succeed in marrying the Widow. If not, Hudibras intends to break his vow, a very un-gentlemanly thing to do. Sidrophel sees them approaching and sends Whachum out to pump Ralph for information. Butler’s description of Whachum makes this sort of activity central to astrology:

His business was to pump and wheedle,

And Men with their own keys unriddle.  
To make to themselves give answers,  
For which they pay the *Necromancers*. (160-161)

Butler exposes the tricks of astrology for the reader, showing us that astrologers use neither the stars nor devils (the center of Ralph's argument to Hudibras for resorting to astrologers) to make their predictions, but just the everyday trickery of thieves. Indeed, Butler goes on to place astrologers as fences within a great network of crime. Interrogatory astrology, Butler says, works because astrologers know who stole your watch, and are willing to get it back to you, for a price:

To fetch and carry *Intelligence*,  
Of whom, and what, and where, and whence,  
And all *Discoveries* disperse,  
Among th' whole *pack* of *Conjurers*;  
What *Cutpurses* have left with them,  
For the right owners to redeem; (161)

Astrology is based on trickery and deception, says Butler, but not on any supernatural forces from the stars. Butler reinforces this message by having Whachum transfer the information about Hudibras to Sidrophel in astrological cant, a term that evokes the underworld with their famous thieves' cant. Sidrophel tells Hudibras that he, Sidrophel, knows why Hudibras has come to see Sidrophel. Hudibras replies that, yes, of course Sidrophel knows, for Sidrophel has had his devils inform him. This is very dangerous ground for Sidrophel, as accusations of being in league with the devil are what underlay the charges against witches, and so Sidrophel defends his astrological art as being based on the stars. The argument which ensues

has many layers of deception. Butler has presented astrology to the reader as a criminal activity, based on human actions of gaining knowledge about possible gulls. This view of astrology has no place for either devils or stars. Hudibras-the-ignorant has become convinced, by the arguments of Ralph-the-knave and by his own willingness to use reason to pursue his self-interest, that astrologers are in league with the devil, and that it is lawful for saints like himself to take advantage of such people. Against the charges of Hudibras, Sidrophel has to defend himself by arguing the true virtues of astrology, virtues that he knows are non-existent. Wasserman points out that the hardest person to convince is the one who is comfortable in their self-deception; Sidrophel makes no progress against Hudibras. At the end, Sidrophel tries to resolve the argument (a parody of scholastic discourse) by recourse to practice—he will cast a horoscope to answer Hudibras. In doing so, Sidrophel relates some of Hudibras' history back to Hudibras, which Hudibras denies. Sidrophel offers as proof Whachum's testimony, since Whachum had stolen Hudibras' cloak and picked Hudibras' pocket. The deception has been dropped—Sidrophel can only defeat Hudibras' arguments about the devil by revealing that he is a thief. The episode ends with violence, as Ralph is sent for the constable and Sidrophel and Whachum attack Hudibras but are easily defeated (one of the few places where Hudibras is genuinely knight-like). Sidrophel fakes death, which leads to Hudibras running away, out of fear of being found with the corpse by the constable.

The importance of *Hudibras* lies in its popularity, and in the concerns about deception that it presents. As Steven Shapin has pointed out, questions of deception were central to this period. An important aspect of the Restoration was that Charles II was invited back; he did not return as conquering hero. He could not dictate terms. The negotiations about who was loyal and who was not, about who and what could be trusted and what not, underlay much of the



culture of the time. Shapin draws on sources about gentlemanly conduct in order to argue that the mode of science proposed by the early Royal Society drew on the gentlemanly codes of honor and disinterest. Hudibras, as we've seen above, violates these codes persistently. He is no gentleman—he wears his honor like a cloak, and all his actions are governed by his self-interest. He is self-deceiving, and this self-deception is absolutely convincing to himself. Throughout the poem, his energy, the energy of the self-righteous, brushes aside all opponents, including Sidrophel, whose own deceptions are no match for Hudibras'. This self-deception stems from an essential part of the character of Hudibras, that of his interest. All of his actions, all of his reasonings, are guided by interest. This, among other things, like his willingness to break his word and his defeat at the hands of the woman Trulla, would lead readers to reject him as a gentleman. Sidrophel is presented in much the same manner by Butler as Subtle was by Jonson: a scam artist with connections to the seedy underworld of London. The impact on astrology of the poem *Hudibras* lies in Butler's stance towards both Hudibras and Sidrophel. Neither is admirable, and implicit in Butler's writing is, I think, the message that a true gentleman would not go near an astrologer.

*The Bickerstaff Papers, The Tatler, and Poor Richard's Almanac.*

Unfortunately, due to time constraints, I will jump directly from Butler to Swift. There is much interesting material in the time period between the two, including Dryden and the whole genre of burlesque almanacs, but marshalling this material simply has taken too much time.

Jonathan Swift's *The Bickerstaff Papers* is sometimes seen as driving the nail into the astrologic coffin. His prediction of the death of John Partridge and Partridge's fulminating response can be seen as discrediting astrology. As McTague (2011) and Eddy (1932) point out, however, the Bickerstaff affair was embedded in a parodic war that was entangled with the

politics of the time. Swift's writings, then, are not *sui generis*, but occur in a particular culture context in which the one-time radical Whig Partridge was under attack by Tories. Swift's character of Isaac Bickerstaff was picked up by Richard Steele, who used Bickerstaff as his character when writing the journal *The Tatler*. Steele was participating in a new cultural phenomena, that of the public sphere. This public sphere was one in which people, and in particular gentlemen and those who wished to be like gentlemen, could learn the proper behavior, the proper manner, and the proper attitude, by reading journals and newspapers. This print public sphere reached much further than the manuscript circles at court or the localized chatter of the coffee houses. Journals like *The Tatler* presented models for how to behave, and Steele's assumption of the character of Bickerstaff was a constant reminder of the correct attitude to take towards astrology. This attitude, and Swift's joke on Partridge, crossed the Atlantic and found root in Philadelphia, in the character of Benjamin Franklin's Poor Richard. In this section, then, I will examine the Bickerstaff papers themselves, Steele's use of the character of Isaac Bickerstaff, and finally Franklin's creation, Poor Richard.

The Bickerstaff papers themselves are short pamphlets, and are mostly focused on Partridge, although Swift does parody the general form of the almanac. Swift is not primarily writing about manners in these pamphlets, but his general concern about manners does come through, in his presentation of astrology, who writes it, and who reads it. Swift wrote in the context of the dispute between Partridge and other astrologers. An important aspect of this dispute is that Partridge had been a radical Whig in the 1680s, and had to leave the country under James II and publish in Holland. His attackers are generally Tories, and they harp on Partridge's radical past, and on Partridge's origins as a cobbler. Swift positions Bickerstaff above these disputants, both the Tories (on whose side Swift is intervening) and Partridge. Bickerstaff is presented as an

astrologer that gentlemen could read, although Swift's satire undermines this position: the asides by Bickerstaff that are meant to appeal to gentlemen are actually appeals to gentlemen by Swift to see through the satire, to see through the persona of Bickerstaff to the author Swift. Consider the following passage:

“As for the few following predictions I now offer the world, I forebore to publish them, till I had perused the several Almanacks for the year we are now entered upon. I found them all in the usual strain, and I beg the reader will compare their manner with mine: and here I make bold to tell the world, that I lay the whole credit of my art upon the truth of these predictions; and I will be content, that Partridge, and the rest of his clan, may hoot me for a cheat and imposter, if I fail in any single particular of moment. I believe, any man who reads this paper, will look upon me to be at least a person of as much honesty and understanding, as a common make of Almanacks. I do not lurk in the dark; I am not wholly unknown in the world; I have set my name at length to be a mark of infamy to mankind, if they shall find I deceive them.” (Swift 457-458)

Here, Bickerstaff puts his almanac above all the others; his almanac is different, and better. Furthermore, his claim that he is “not wholly unknown in the world” is shot through with irony. Bickerstaff himself is utterly unknown; Swift had apparently seen the name on a sign on one of his travels, and took it for the name of his astrologer. Swift, however, does at this time have a bit of a name. He is perhaps not as well-known as Partridge, for Partridge's sales far outstrip anything that Swift has written by this time (1708), but Swift is known in the right circles; those in the know would know that Bickerstaff was a pseudonym. Indeed, even Partridge knows that Bickerstaff was a pseudonym, although his guess as to the real author was wrong. In short, this passage has Bickerstaff positioning his almanac above the common run of

almanacs, and has Swift hinting that the knowledgeable reader should look behind the text to the author Swift. Finally, there is a gesture of dismissal—Partridge and his clan can hoot all they wish upon the failure of Bickerstaff’s predictions (and fail they did), but Bickerstaff is an imposter; hooting at the failure of an imposter to make genuine predictions will only undermine the position of astrologers. And this came to pass: Partridge’s counter-attacks just made things worse. Swift put the astrologers in an impossible position, because Swift’s readers, the gentlemen, were being advised by Swift not to take the astrologers seriously. If the astrologers do not hoot, then the gentlemen will laugh at them for not defending their profession. If the astrologers do hoot, then the gentlemen will laugh at them for taking Swift’s joke seriously. Although Swift does not explicitly write about how gentlemen should think about astrologers, his attitude is clear.

Swift communicates his disdain (and, implicitly, the disdain a gentleman ought to feel for these almanacs) in a number of ways. Bickerstaff, in the passage above, indicated that he is publishing only the “few following predictions”, as opposed to the many predictions of the usual almanac. His predictions are few and choice, more a few delicacies than “a yearly stock of nonsense, lies, folly, and impertinence, which they offer to the world as genuine from the planets, although they descend from no greater a height than their own brains.” (455) He explicitly condemns the writers of almanacs as “a few, mean, illiterate traders” (455) and as men that “do not so much as understand grammar and syntax; that they are not able to spell any word out of the usual road, nor, even in their prefaces, to write common sense, or intelligible English” (456). These men are not gentlemen. His disdain extends to some of the readers of almanacs:

Nor am I at all offended, or think it an injury to the art, when I see the common dealers in it, the *Students in astrology*, the *Philomaths*, and the rest of that tribe,

treated by wise men with the utmost scorn and contempt; but I rather wonder, when I observe gentlemen in the country, rich enough to serve the nation in Parliament, poring in Partridge's almanac, to find out the events of the year, at home and abroad; not daring to propose a hunting match, until Gadbury or he hath fixed the weather. (456)

He suggests the correct attitude for the "wise man" to take to the tribe of astrologers, implicitly putting Bickerstaff outside of the tribe (but the wise reader understands satire, and that Bickerstaff is an ironic tool for Swift), but contrasts these wise men with the country gentlemen, who take these almanacs seriously. Here, Swift is writing for the city gentleman, the sophisticate. The suggestion that someone serving the nation in Parliament would be the type of person who uses an almanac to "find out the events of the year" is a serious charge against those country gentry who are not as knowledgeable as they ought to be. Weather, too, was an important aspect of the almanacs, and one that Swift left out of the Bickerstaff predictions. Bickerstaff makes two weather predictions, one of a great storm in France and "SEPTEMBER. This month begins with a very surprising fit of frosty weather, which will last near twelve days." (461). By refraining from weather predictions, Bickerstaff elevates his predictions (it's hard to call it an almanac, since it is deliberately missing so many aspects of the genre) above the run of the mill almanac. By implication, the country gentry looking for weather in the almanacs are not true gentlemen, because they lack the knowingness to see through these weather predictions.

Swift compares Bickerstaff to Partridge, not explicitly, but in a way the knowing reader would draw forth. Bickerstaff describes himself as disinterested:

I hope I have some share of reputation, which I would not willingly forfeit for a frolic or humour; and I believe no gentleman who reads this paper, will look upon it to be of the same cast or mould with the common scribbles that are every day hawked about. My fortune has placed me above the little regard of writing for a few pence, which I neither value nor want. (462)

He does not need the money; he writes for the honor of the art. Of course, the satire undermines the surface meaning of the words—Swift writes this as a frolic, and a knowing gentleman would certainly not read it as being “of the same cast” as other almanacs, here dismissed as “common scribbles.” Contrast this with the words that Swift puts in the mouth of the dying Partridge (464):

I am a poor ignorant fellow, bred to a mean trade; yet I have sense enough to know that all pretences of foretelling by astrology are deceits, for this manifest reason, because the wise and the learned, who can only judge whether there be any truth in this science, do all unanimously agree to laugh at and despise it; and none but the poor ignorant vulgar give it any credit and that only upon the word of such silly wretches as I and my fellows, who can hardly write or read. (464)

“We have a common form for all those things: as to foretelling the weather, we never meddle with that, but leave it to the printer, who takes it out of any old almanack as he thinks fit: the rest was my own invention to make my almanack sell, having a wife to maintain, and no way to get my bread; for mending old shoes is a poor livelihood; and” (added he, sighing) “I wish I may not have done more mischief by my physic than by my astrology; although I had some good

receipts from my grandmother, and my own compositions were such, as I thought could at least do no hurt.” (464-465).

The astrologer Partridge was a cobbler, and he had tried to rise above his station by writing almanacs. Unlike Bickerstaff, Partridge was *interested*; he had to make money, and so he put in whatever he thought would make the almanac sell. He was not interested in the Art of Astrology, but in filthy lucre. Partridge is also made here to draw back the curtain on the mechanics of writing almanacs—the weather predictions, the ones that the country gentry so dutifully examine, are not even from Partridge. The printer, even lower than the almanac writer, is responsible for them. Swift here also makes an explicit claim for the right attitude towards these almanacs: “laugh at and despise it.” Almanacs are created by poor people to make money; they are not fit for the sophisticated gentlemen of the town.

Richard Steele’s *The Tatler* continued the Bickerstaff joke. He took Bickerstaff to be the persona of *The Tatler*, to be the voice commenting on London society. Steele explicitly set up Bickerstaff as the censor of London, passing judgment on the behavior of polite society in his court of honor (Steele, 165). Here is one of the first journals of the public sphere, dedicated to creating correct manners and correct attitudes. It was read by those who were gentlemen, and those who wanted to be gentlemen. It taught the correct attitude, an essential component of which was disinterest. Bickerstaff, as an old, well-off gentleman, was a perfect persona for the task. He did not need money, but was not so rich as to be embroiled in business or politics. He had no political axe to grind. Furthermore, as an old man, he was immune to the burning of lust. One of the few times Bickerstaff actually functions as an astrologer in the pages of *The Tatler* was in Number 13, *The Case of the Unhappy Gentlewoman*. A young woman, about thirty, comes to visit Bickerstaff, who describes her as vivacious. She addresses him by “Mr.

Bickerstaff, you see before you the unhappiest of women; and therefore, as you are esteemed by all the world both a great civilian as well as an astrologer, I must desire your advice and assistance in putting me in a method of obtaining a divorce from a marriage which I know the law will pronounce void.” Her husband, she says, is no true husband, but like one of those Italian singers. Bickerstaff asks the woman to remember the difficulties of a court case, about how so much will come out, and how so many people will gossip:

How little (will they say) could that lady command her passions! Besides, consider, that curbing our desires is the greatest glory we can arrive at in this world, and will be most rewarded in the next.

She answered, like a prudent matron: ‘Sir, if you please to remember the office of matrimony, the first cause of its institution is that of having posterity: therefore, as to the curbing desires, I am willing to undergo any abstinence from food as you please to enjoin me; but I cannot, with any quiet of mind, live in the neglect of a necessary duty, and an express commandment: “Increase and multiply.”

“Observing she was learned, and knew so well the duties of life, I turned my argument rather to dehort her from this public procedure by examples rather than precepts.” (24)

After this exchange, and after further examples, she exclaims:

“I presented you with a half-guinea, in hopes not only to have my conscience eased, but my fortune told.” (24)

The reader is meant to draw from this that she wants to know if her husband will ever be able to have sex again. The punch-line comes towards the end, after Bickerstaff finds out that her husband is about fifty and that they’ve been married for about fifteen years:



“How happened it you never communicated your distress in all this time, to your friends and relations?”

She answered, “He has been thus but a fortnight.” (25)

Bickerstaff laughingly suggests that divorce will be impossible, since such an infirmity caused by age is no grounds for relief. She replies:

“I find you have no more learning than Dr. Case; and I am told of a young man, not five and twenty, just come from Oxford, to whom I will communicate this whole matter, and doubt not but he will appear to have seven times more useful and satisfactory knowledge than you and all your boasted family.” (25)

I think implied here is that she will commence an affair with the young man from Oxford. Bickerstaff may have been of more use to her, had he not been so old. Here, his age supports his disinterest. An interesting point about this exchange is that the only person who comes to Bickerstaff to have a fortune told is a woman, and that the cause of her coming to visit is due to her lust, which has, for the last two weeks, been stifled by her husband’s impotence. That women were not in control of their passions was a given at the time; that these passions could lead them to such foolish actions as visiting an astrologer was a consequence.

Finally, we come to Ben Franklin and *Poor Richard’s Almanack*. This is a nice endpoint for this essay, in that Franklin, as a provincial in Philadelphia, was interested in bringing the styles of London to America. *Poor Richard’s Almanack* draws on the tradition of parody almanacs in the style of *Poor Robin’s Almanack*, and Franklin also, almost explicitly, draws on the Bickerstaff tradition, in two ways. First, in the very first *Poor Richard’s Almanack*, he predicts the death of a rival astrologer, Titan Leeds. Second, Franklin draws on the advisory-literature tradition of *The Tatler*, in that Franklin offers advice on how one ought to comport

oneself. Of course, Franklin disposes of his advice as epitaphs or short poems, rather than writing the extended prose passages of Steele, but the underlying concern is the same. Franklin desires to import proper behavior, the behavior of London, to Philadelphia. This concern would, after 1740, become the major focus of *Poor Richard's Almanack*, which was published from 1733 to 1758. The astrology aspect of the character of Poor Richard remained in the forefront of Franklin's almanacs throughout the first eight issues (1733-1740). These early almanacs insist on Richard's poverty; the very first almanac begins with a justification for the printing that echoes Swift's speech that he put in the mouth of the dying Partridge:

The plain Truth of the Matter is, I am excessive poor, and my Wife, good Woman, is, I tell her, excessive proud; she cannot bear, she says, to sit spinning in her Shift of Tow, while I do nothing but gaze at the stars; and has threatned more than once to burn all my Books and Rattling Traps (as she calls my Instruments) if I do not make some profitable Use of them for the good of my Family. (3)

Franklin presents his astrologer Richard as interested from the beginning. His wife (whose name, we find out in 1738, is Bridget) seems to be a bit of a termagant, and Richard must bring money into the house to keep her happy. These early almanacs are somewhat harsh on women; consider the following from 1733:

Kind Katherine to her husband kiss'd these words,  
"Mine own sweet Will, how dearly I love thee!"  
If true (quoth Will) the World no such affords.  
And that it's true I durst his warrant be  
For ne'er heard I of Woman good or ill  
But always loved best, her own sweet Will. (7)

He does balance this out a bit, with statements like “a good Wife lost is God’s gift lost,” (9), also from 1733, but, on the whole, women don’t come out well in the early almanacs. My guess is that he heard about this from his readers, because in 1738 Bridget Saunders writes the preface:

My good Man set out last Week for *Potowmack*, to visit an old Stargazer of his Acquaintance, and see about a little Place for us to settle and end our Days on. He left the Copy of his Almanack seal’d up, and bid me send it to the Press. I suspected something, and therefore, as soon as he was gone, I open’d it, to see if he had not been flinging some of his old Skitts at me. Just as I thought, so it was. And truly, (for want of something else to say, I suppose) he had put into his Preface, that his wife *Bridget*—was this, and that, and t’other.—What a pease-cods! cannot I have a little Fault or two, but all the Country must see it in print! They have already been told, at one time that I am proud, another time that I am loud, and that I have got a new Petticoat, and abundance of such kind of stuff; and now, forsooth! all the world must know, that *Poor Dick’s* Wife has lately taken a fancy to drink a little Tea now and then. A mighty matter, truly, to make a Song of! ‘Tis true; I had a little Tea of a Present from the Printer last Year; and what, must a body throw it away? In short, I thought the Preface not worth a printing, and so I fairly scratch’d it all out, and I believe you’ll like our Almanack never the worse for it.

Upon looking over the Months, I see he has put in an abundance of Foul Weather this year; and therefore I have scatter’d here and there, where I could find room, some *fair, pleasant, sunshiny, &c.* for the Good-Women to dry their clothes in. If

it does not come to pass according to my Desire, I have shown my Good-will, however; and I hope they'll take it in good part. (55-56)

This passage illustrates many of the themes in this essay. Bridget Saunders is curious and willful, and cannot leave the package unsealed but must open it and change the preface around. Not only that, but her changing of the weather recalls Swift's description of how almanacs come up with their weather predictions. In this case, it is not the printer who inserts the weather, but the astrologer's wife. And she is an interested party—she changes the weather so that she, and her fellow good-women, can dry the clothes of the household. Almanacs are not to be trusted, for the procedures of their creation are not to be trusted.

### Conclusion

In this brief look at the astrologer in a handful of texts between 1600 to 1740, we've seen a move in the attitude of writers and audiences towards astrologers. Astrologers themselves are almost always presented as scam artists and thieves, and so the interesting question is not about astrologers, but about who interacts with them, how and why they do so, and what the attitude of the reader or audience ought to be. Early in the 17th century, gentlemen could be victims of astrologers without sacrificing their status as gentlemen. The idea of the gentleman, at that time, did include the concepts of discernment and disinterestedness. Astrology, in and of itself, was not enough to trigger the discernment of gentlemen; astrology was not yet something that a gentleman would see through. Gentlemen could be victims of astrology, especially when some great passion overwhelmed their disinterestedness. The Restoration sharpened these particular aspects of being a gentleman. Discernment and disinterestedness were virtues that could help keep the Carolean state stable. Astrologers are still thieves, but the attitude towards them is changing. The discerning gentleman ought to be able to see through the machinations of

astrologers. By 1710, this discernment with respect to astrology is, I think, embedded in the identity of the gentleman. One of the markers of the sophisticated gentleman of the 1710s was a healthy disregard of astrology; this was not a marker of the sophisticated gentleman of the 1610s.

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# The Performance of Chaste Masculinity in *King Horn*

Ruth Gripenrog, University of North Dakota

## Introduction

*King Horn*, an anonymous chivalric romance believed to be composed around 1170, projects and reflects proper constructions and performances of masculinity. As a Matter of England poem, it is instrumental in creating a national English identity through its focus on the feudal order as correct. By the later 12th century, “the growing political isolation of England was manifested in feudal institutions and laws” that differed from those of the French (Crane 2). Matter of English poems served specific English needs by reinforcing the contemporary feudal order. *King Horn* stands apart from other Matter of England poems, like *Havelok the Dane* and *Bevis of Hampton*, in that there is no indication of the future royal lineage. If readers are to take this poem as a reflection of the ideals of the correct construction and performance of masculinity, then transgressions of masculinity cannot be ignored. Horn’s ultimate infringement is not procreating, a violation of both the heteronormative matrix and the expected duty of kings. There is very little about chaste marriage in chivalric romances, and in reality, with a few exceptions, chaste marriage was not common in the monarchy unless it was a second or third marriage. For the purposes of this paper, I follow Dyan Elliot’s construction of spiritual marriage from Augustine, meaning a marriage of sexual continence or virginity, as opposed to a marriage defined as chaste on the basis of the couple only having conjugal relations with one another.

Judith Butler argues that gender and sex are not biological, but rather constructed within a society. The performance of one’s gender enables identity formation, though the identity and performances change both temporally and spatially. While medieval audiences did not see gender as performative in this sense but rather as biologically destined, heroes in the literature still perform their gender in a myriad of ways as they negotiate different communities and sets of



values. One theory medieval audiences would probably agree on was the Foucaudian lens of masculinity as domination, or the ability to wield power over subordinates.

Returning to the poem, *King Horn* appears on the cusp of when chivalry is introduced into Britain. The masculinity extolled in the poem is differentiated from continental masculinity, which centered on prowess in battle. Indeed, the poem also lacks the courtly love code that was popular in continental romances, as Rymenhild, Horn's wife, is the active pursuer in the relationship, though she does portray lovesickness in order to manipulate the men around her. To give a brief overview of the poem, Horn is initially disinherited after the murder of his father by Saracens. Horn must overcome this loss of identity through proving himself as a knight, slowly regaining his rightful identity through his ability to dominate others. However, the person he must ultimately dominate is Rymenhild, whose initial social superiority overshadows his thralldom. Horn defeats the Saracen enemies threatening to invade the lands he visits as well as the traitor Fikenhild. The poem ends with Horn reproducing publicly: he and Rymenhild rule Suddene, while he gives control of Westernness to Athelbrus and Ireland to Athulf and Reynild, whose marriage he oversees.

This is a shorter version of a longer paper which originally focused on the Saracen relationships within the poem, with an emphasis on how Horn proves his masculinity through warfare against the Saracens, as well as an examination of the personal relationship between the main characters. For the sake of time, I will be looking exclusively at his relationship with Rymenhild today. Through an examination of how his identity is constructed and how he is emasculated in the relationship with Rymenhild, I argue that Horn performs an alternative chaste masculinity as opposed to a chivalric masculinity. Moreover, his masculinity in and of itself must be questioned: for how can a man be a man if he doesn't penetrate anything? Most scholars see

the marriage of Rymenhild and Horn as a licit marriage with conjugal relations, but if there is no proof of consummation via procreation, then the marriage, and the social structures the poem reinforces, must be questioned.

### Emasculation

Returning to the poem, the emasculation of Horn is most prominent at the start of his relationship with Rymenhild. Until Horn is able to prove himself both as a man and a knight, Rymenhild is the clear active partner, reversing the appropriate roles. Medieval thinkers saw biology as destiny in terms of gendered sexuality, where “two genders—two sexes—was the natural state” (Salisbury 81). Joyce Salisbury notes that as a result of the different requirements in the enactment of gender, “a man’s power dictated...that he be active in the world and the active partner in his sexual relationships” (85) While Salisbury no doubt means sexual relationships implicitly as intercourse, a man’s power prescribed him to be the pursuer of women, with his gaze rightfully fixed upon her. If a woman usurped this role, she was no longer acting as a proper woman, and was a larger challenge to masculinity because of this transgression. Rymenhild indeed usurps the male gaze, and pursues Horn. She uses manipulation to privately spend time with Horn by the description of “She began to appear downcast” so that Athelbrus will quickly bring Horn to her (*Horn* 274). This manipulation speaks cogently to the perceived views of women: out of control with emotion. However, the narrator tells the reader that Athelbrus, perhaps knowing that she is lovesick, thought “What Rymenhild thought / Seemed very strange to him” (281-2) He then deceives her on the basis that he “fear[s] greatly / That she will advise Horn badly” (295-6). That Athelbrus questions Rymenhild’s motives carries with it the implication that he deceives her as a result of a questionable sexuality. After all,

Rymenhild does want Horn “into [her] private chamber,” a private chamber meant to control women, but also keep men safe from their enticement (273).

Women’s sexuality was believed to be centered in her navel, which represented “passivity, receptiveness, and nurturing” (Salisbury 85) Not only were women meant to be soft and passive, but also they were seen as carnal and embodied sexuality, and “by ‘enervating a man’s mind’ and interfering with his ‘thought,’ woman removed him from the rational world of the mind that defined him as spiritual” (86). In other words, because women desired intercourse at all times, they naturally enticed men, even if a man merely looked at a woman. This explains Athelbrus’s hesitation to allow Horn to enter Rymenhild’s chamber, as she could entice him to transgress proper feudal relations between a vassal and his lord. Moreover, as passive receptacles, women’s “sexuality was seen to be open and receptive;” the openness metaphor of sexual women extended to garrulousness (87). Rymenhild is indeed garrulous in her pursuit of Horn, such as when she berates Athelbrus for deceiving her, as she says “From here go, you wicked thief / Nor will you be dear to me / Get out of my bower / With much bad luck. / May shame overtake you / And on the gallows hang. / I do not speak with Horn: / He is not so ugly; / Horn is fairer than [Athulf]: / With much shame may you die” (*Horn* 327-36). These nine lines display her agency to speak, and emphasize the authority she has over Athelbrus.

Even when she is deceived, Rymenhild displays control and activity, as “Then upon Athulf child / Rymenhild began to go crazy: / She thought that it was Horn / That she had there: / She set him on the bed: / In her two arms / She began to lie with Athulf” (299-306). Rymenhild displays an active sexuality in her conduct toward him: her excitement to see him shows an inability to control herself, both in her emotions and demeanor, as well as a strong carnal desire; by setting him on the bed and revealing passion as well shows her lust for him; by embracing

him with no explanation of his reaction other than passive acceptance solidly reverses the role between the man and woman. Though this is not the real Horn, Rymenhild displays her lack of reason in allowing herself to display such an open sexuality to the wrong person. Her lust overcame her reason, alluding to a need for her to be controlled in the end.

Rymenhild, as the daughter and heir of the king, has great authority from her social status. She displays this in her reprimand of Athelbrus, resulting in him to “right away / fell immediately on the ground” (337-8) and promise, “And Horn I will to you fetch / Whoever may care” (355-6). Athelbrus thus becomes a supplicant to her will. Horn, too, displays supplication to Rymenhild’s social status, when he “set himself on his knees”(387), and Rymenhild takes full control of the episode as “Ryemnhild stood / and took him by the hand: / She set him on a fur mantle / With wine to drink his fill: / She showed him good cheer / And took him around the neck / Often she kissed him, / As much as she liked. / Horn, she said, doubtless, / You shall have me for your wife” (403-12) Rymenhild is the clear active partner in this scene, as evidenced by the active verbs used to describe how she dominates him. She stands, she leads, she plies him with drink, she grasps, she kisses, she maneuvers. This scene mirrors her interaction with Athulf, but extends her activity to allow her to kiss Horn as much as she liked, further emphasizing her rampant sexuality. Furthermore, her control is ultimately shown in the succinct and direct assertion that “you shall have me as your wife.” Her confidence in the desired outcome shows the authority she has.

Horn surrenders to her most when he gives his initial reason for being unable to marry her on the basis that “It would be no fair wedding / Between a thrall and a king” (427-8). By juxtaposing their social positions so sharply, Horn draws attention to his lack of proper identity in being a good candidate for a husband. Moreover, by referring to Rymenhild as a king, Horn

himself masculinizes her and the authority she has. In order to be able to be worthy of her, he calls for her aid to “Help me to become a knight / By all thy might, / To my lord the king / That he dub me” (439-42). His reliance on her authority places him as the submissive partner. Her authority is further shown when she says, “Horn...well soon / That shall be done. / You shall be dubbed knight / Before a week is up” (449-52). Rymenhild not only speaks many times in this episode, but also she speaks with a clear intent to make sure that her words turn into concrete actions. That she is the actual reason Horn is knighted displays her as a character with force, even if the force is motivated by lust.

### Chaste Marriage and Masculinity

As I argued in the longer version of this essay, Horn does display a correct version of masculinity through his prowess against Saracens. In his relationship with Rymenhild, he begins to assert a masculine authority once he has gained an identity of a knight. Horn dictates that he must prove himself as a knight before he can marry Rymenhild, citing their different social statuses and his need to prove himself in battle. Horn upholds the idea of young knighthood as a time to go searching for ways to prove themselves, and marriage as a time to settle down into one socially assigned role: fatherhood. However, through the infraction of chaste marriage, Horn cannot be truly masculine: he embodies, rather, a chaste masculinity.

In the medieval mindset, sons were seen as inheriting their father’s knightly abilities. In a way this limited knightly masculinity to the realm of the elite, as the knight was born in the right family and therefore already superior to all other classes. Through the strong connection with the father, the young man situates himself in the tradition of his ancestors, just as Horn is poised to succeed in continuing his dynastic line. However, there is no evidence of Horn reproducing, and this is his most transgressive action. *The Romance of Horn*, an Anglo-Norman predecessor to

*King Horn* explicitly states the continuation of the patrilineal line through his son Hadermod, so the exclusion of this information in the English poem is highly significant, *especially* if the poem is to be seen as a Matter of England that sustains the feudal order as the correct order of society (Crane 27). The author of *King Horn*, after cataloguing Horn's actions upon his return to Suddenne, the next description is "All the people grieved him / That loved him so true: / Now they both are dead" (1535-38). If there is no evidence of a consummation—evidence being pregnancy—then the marriage must be questioned.

Gary Lim explains away this transgression as the result of an "emphasis on how the protagonis[t] create[s] a vast empire through a web of kinship and feudal relations, rather than on how their descendants inherit and secure the original homeland" (47). By passing out lands to those who have been loyal to him, Horn actively creates a communal public identity through the connections and loyalties owed to him. Additionally, Horn acts as a guardian in the arrangement of the marriage between Reynild and Athulf, "using marriage for his own political advantage" (48). Lim does concede that the lack of a biological lineage is "glaring, since the romance has emphasized the magnitude of Horn's dispossession and the broken line of succession between father and son from its beginning," (48-9) though he does not consider a chaste marriage to be the cause, and excuses the transgression as the romance shifts focus from "vertical lines of descent to horizontal ties of alliance" (49). However, these vertical lines shouldn't be ignored, and a medieval audience that favored texts that reinforced the social values of the time would see this lack of reproduction as highly problematic, though through the horizontal lines, Horn is more holy.

Marriage was the goal of all family heirs, as it was their responsibility to continue the family line. Leaders of the church "tended to see women for their sexual potential, sex for its

procreative potential, and marriage as the institution created for housing these two most essential, but rather dangerous components of society” (Elliot, 4). The most important result of marriage “was the fathering of legitimate children,” as “until a man did so, he had not claimed his place in the genealogical chain” (Karras 16). This directly opposes Lim’s assertion that Horn would surpass his father, for if he cannot even take his place in the chain, he is not a fit ruler. In this respect, Horn’s masculinity is transgressive, and aligns more with chaste masculinity than chivalric. It threatens the stability of the feudal order by the simple fact of “marriage as a social institution that helps to define feudal status” (Crane 88). The peace won by the hero cannot be guaranteed to last past his lifetime. However, in his role as guardian, Horn reproduces publicly. He has built an empire through giving Westernness to Athulbrus and Ireland to Athulf and Reynild. Additionally, through this, Horn penetrates the feminine landscape through his control of them, thereby displaying a correct sense to masculinity.

A man’s masculinity was tied in his sperm, and therefore his ability to reproduce. It was seen as coming from the brain, and therefore equated with reason; it was also seen as pure and highly valuable (Salisbury 89). As a result of his value, men were advised to “save their vital force” because “excessive intercourse” had the potential negative consequences of “weakness, trembling, nervousness, abdominal pain, and hemorrhage” (90). For many church fathers, marriage centered around the concept of the conjugal debt, in which neither partner could refuse conjugal relations to the other partner. However, the marital debt required each partner to provide release when the other requested intercourse, though Thomas Aquinas believed that a man did not need to risk physical harm in the payment of the debt.

Augustine is seen as the architect of chaste marriage “since he was the first to develop a full and coherent theory of marriage that was not dependent on the conjugal debt” (Elliot 43).

Nevertheless, even he saw marriage and procreation as part of God's original intention for humanity, and marriage in his terms was described as "a kind of friendly and genuine union of the one ruling and the other obeying." A chaste marriage was one embodied in the participants' ability to control their sexuality, based on the perception that "sex [w]as an activity that held a true Christian from the achievement of sanctity" (McGlynn & Moll 104). In Paul's view, marriage and sexual activity consumed time that could be better used in service to God. However, without sexual activity, questions arose as to what made a marriage legitimate. Gratian held that consummation was a natural part of an indissoluble marriage (108). In addition, Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims included consummation as an essential component. Hugh of St. Victor, on the other hand, distinguished two sacraments within marriage to make both a consummated and unconsummated marriage indissoluble. The marriage itself represented the union of God and the soul, and therefore did not need consummation, while the office of marriage necessitated consummation as it represented the union between Christ and the church. This allowed for the couple to "mutually vow continence at beginning of their marriage" (108) and to become "two in one flesh on the basis of consent...as opposed to the commingling of bodies" (Elliot 67). However, once a vow was taken, the death of one partner does not negate it, which highlights the importance of both members of the relationship agreeing to the chaste marriage.

I see the marriage between Rymenhild and Horn as being a chaste one based on Hugh of St. Victor's classification of an unconsummated marriage as indissoluble. After their promises of fidelity, Horn refers to her as his "wyve," though this means betrothed rather than married. However, through their mutual promise to marry each other, their union is all but consummated, and therefore aligns with a chaste marriage agreement (*Horn* 725). Numerous times, Horn refers



to his promise to marry her: pledging “I will do all of your instruction / when the time is right” (546-7), and his ultimate pledge comes when Rymenhild has had the terrible premonition of their separation, as Horn tells her “I shall make myself your own / To hold and to know / Above any other creature / And to you my truth I pledge” (673-6). Furthermore, Rymenhild’s justification as to why she cannot marry King Mod is that “She had a husband / Though he was out of the country” (1049-50). As a result of their pledge of fidelity to one another, on top of the Rymenhild’s gift of the ring, their marriage is shown as already indissoluble.

Chaste marriage held a more popular, in terms of numbers, place within the clergy than in the laity. Pat Cullum explains that “where the non-sexual man appears, it is almost always a problematic figure” (622). Chastity in men raised frightening questions on masculinity: “Can one be a man without deployment he most obvious biological attributes of manhood?” (Murray 130). Additionally, chaste marriage disrupted traditional gender roles and challenged normative concepts like female submission, for in writings covering chaste marriage, the chaste wife often assumes the role of the sister and is no longer completely under the control of the husband. More importantly, it was most often women who desired a chaste marriage, which gave them agency over their own bodies as they could now choose whether or not to consummate the marriage. The husbands, on the other hand, are seen as reluctant to enter into these types of relationships, as their

relative foot-dragging bespoke his closer association with social position and public life, which a change to chastity undercut, while a woman’s eagerness bespoke resistance to her physical implication in a system where the dividends were, admittedly, low. (Elliot 55)

Sex was a way to portray his masculinity through the domination of women, and the husband usually only complied after his will had been broken by outside forces such as impotence. Elliot notes that “this kind of ‘psychic emasculation’ contributed to the destabilization of his authority and the construction of new roles.” To overcome this, the church fathers had to set disciplinary actions: Augustine in particular argues that “release from the conjugal debt in no way impairs the husband’s authority over the wife” and even went as far as to say that “the more subjected a woman is, the more chaste she is.”

Medieval theologians placed a high importance on female virginity as “it was a state of wholeness and purity, which carried promise of a hundred-fold reward in heaven” (Cullum 624). Not only are they spiritually whole through the renunciation of sexual activity, but also were biologically whole with an intact hymen. For the purposes of the male clergy, marriage was deprecated in favor of virginity in order to foster social cohesion among the celibate, though this practice led to the alternative practice of chastity in marriage (Elliot 40). So medieval theologians placed importance on female virginity as a way for women to get into heaven, while the idea of male virgins were likened to Christ, thereby celebrating male celibacy.

The most extensive and popular discussion of male virginity in the secular sphere is that of Edward the Confessor, who just like the clergy fostered social cohesion. Far from being seen as a problematic figure, Edward’s virginity “was a symbol of wholeness and a guarantor of peace in his kingdom” even while his childless reign disastrously led to the Norman Conquest (Cullum 626). Elliot notes that this leads to the phenomenon of a virgin king being “a convenient explanation for a disruption in succession—be it an awkward interregnum or the end of a dynasty” (123). The lives of heirless monarchs were cast in a monkish mode, and Edward’s most prominent claim to sanctity was his chastity. In the case of sanctified kings, they are only

canonized posthumously, “which does nothing to increase their power in life, but rather enhances the power and control of the church considerably” (125). Virgin kings, then, were especially elevated due to their high responsibility to produce heirs than the average layperson and instead became “eunuchs for God.” This in turn combats a sense of crisis in masculinity as “the virgin king topos...reveal masculine efforts to monopolize chastity—this former bastion of female virtuosity” (129).

Horn, as well, can be seen as a symbol of wholeness and peace, as the succinct ending constructs Horn as a well-love lord when his people grieve for him, those that “loved him so true” (1536). In addition, Horn could be seen as performing “a necessary precondition for the proper performance of sexuality in others,” through his role as guardian over the marriage of Rymhild and Athulf; though, as stated previously, this peace is not sustainable after his lifetime (Elliot 129).

### Conclusion

Ultimately, through his transgression of nonprocreation, Horn constructs his masculinity through an alternative one of chastity. Though semen was the measure of man’s masculinity, and his sole responsibility as lord, it was highly valuable, and thus must be conserved in order for the man to retain all of his reason. In this way, Horn is more rational, and therefore masculine. This alternative masculinity is constructed against Rymenhild, who feminizes Horn through the reversal of active roles in the relationship. However, if *King Horn* is to be taken as a work on the Matter of England, his transgressions cannot be ignored, because they call into question not only Horn’s right to rule, but the entire feudal order the poem attempts to reinforce. “Here ends the tale of Horn” (1539), but so, too, is the stability and family line, if not the masculinity, of Horn ended.

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# To Rectify Man's Ways to Man: Milton, Locke, and the Paradox of Tolerance

Art Marmorstein, Northern State University

“Tolerance is the easy virtue—the virtue of a man without convictions”, said G.K. Chesterton, and at first it might seem that tolerance sets no very high standard. Commandments to tolerate God with all your heart, soul, mind and strength and to tolerate one's neighbor as oneself do not have quite the right ring—and I do not think my wife would be well pleased if I began each day telling her how much I tolerated her.

But a consistent commitment to tolerance turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to maintain, and it is ironic how often the great champions of tolerance (Voltaire and Diderot for instance) end up providing a basis for an extreme bigotry. “There will never be peace in the world until the last nobleman is hung by the entrails of the last clergyman” isn't so funny in 1793.

Sooner or later, the advocates of a “why can't we all just get along?” type of philosophy end up wrestling (for the most part, unsuccessfully) with the paradox of tolerance, a principle well illustrated in Tom Lehrer's introduction to his song, National Brotherhood Week. “There are people in this world who do not love their fellow man, and I hate people like that.”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau likewise reflects a self-aware irony in his comments on religious pluralism in his ideal state:

Now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive national religion, tolerance should be given to all religions that tolerate others, so long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship. But whoever dares to say: *Outside the Church is no salvation*, ought to be driven from the State (*Social Contract* IV.8).

All religions are tolerated—if they've been safely neutered.

And then there's William and Mary's 1689 religious settlement with parliament, what we call the "Toleration Act" even though it forbids unlicensed religious assemblies, compels Sunday church attendance at one of the permitted venues, excludes non-Anglicans for public office and from the universities, and specifically excludes protection to Catholics and non-Trinitarians:

Neither this act, nor any clause, article, or thing herein contained, shall extend or be construed to extend to give any ease, benefit or advantage to any papist or popish recusant whatsoever, or any person that shall deny in his preaching or writing the doctrine of the blessed Trinity, as it is declared in the aforesaid articles of religion (Section XVII).

Well, it is still rightly called a Toleration Act—if we think of it as an act that draws a line between what can and cannot be tolerated. But why is the line drawn where it is? Why after half a century of debates and shifting policies did England end up with this workable but not completely satisfactory official policy on religious freedom?

In introducing his *Letter Concerning Toleration* (written in 1685 and published in 1689), John Locke noted that no nation under heaven that had written so much on toleration—and that no nation stood in greater need of something more to be said and done (21). And I would say, similarly, that although 17<sup>th</sup> century ideas of tolerance have been thoroughly analyzed already, there's still room for a conference paper.

In particular, it's worth looking again at why both John Milton and John Locke are unwilling to follow their own arguments to what seems to us the logical conclusion: tolerance of all religious ideas. Why do both writers exclude Catholics? And is this as inconsistent as it seems?

I will argue here that that both writers are grappling with the paradox of tolerance. They know that they line has to be drawn somewhere, that, for tolerance to be practical, there must be an agreed on common ground. But I will also argue that both Milton and Locke confront the paradox at a different point from what we might expect.

John Milton's *Areopagitica*, great defense of freedom of speech, press, and thought that it is, is particularly puzzling in its failure to pursue arguments to what seems their logical conclusion. "As good almost kill a man as kill a good book, who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in the eye," says Milton.

He then takes us on a tour of the classical history, claiming that, in healthy times, writers were free to speak to publish their works no matter how controversial the idea. Only libelous or immoral books went to the fires. He rationalizes away Plato's argument for censorship in the Republic: an imaginary society filled with plenty of other undesirable restrictions. And the burned books mentioned in Acts? These were books voluntarily destroyed by their owners. It's foolish to think the cause of truth is aided by censorship:

For who knows not that Truth is strong next to the Almighty? She needs no policies, nor strategems, nor licensing to make her victorious; those are the shifts and the defences that error uses against her power.

Only forcible suppression can stop the victory of truth:

Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?



Truth and error grow together like tares and wheat. Misguided attempts to suppress error will inevitably force truth to (like Proteus) assume something other than her natural shape in her attempt to gain freedom.

Another analogy. Truth has been torn apart like Osiris, and the work of the current age is restore the body of truth piece by piece. Further, it is in the process of learning to separate truth from error that God brings about our salvation.

Milton's arguments would seem to lead straight to complete toleration—the position Roger Williams' takes in *Bloudy Tenent of Persecution*, a work published in 1644—the same year as *Areopagitica*. And since Williams and Milton apparently had discussed the toleration issue some months earlier, one would have thought Milton open to extending toleration to Catholic works also—but, at this point, he does not.

Partly, this is because 1644 England was not 1644 America. The licensing act Milton objects to originated with the majority Presbyterian wing of parliament, a faction that sought to replace the established Anglican Church with an established Presbyterian church. Milton points out that Presbyterian policies are no better than those of the hated Star Chamber. “Look at what was happening to your books just a few years back”, says Milton. “You are behaving just like Anglicans or (worse) Catholics.” Milton demonizes book banning/licensing as a Catholic innovation, unknown before the rise of the papacy. Just a little a while ago, you Presbyterians were asking for toleration: now in control, you're no more tolerant than anyone else.

For Williams in *Bloudy Tenent*, the only way to resolve the “persecuted becomes the persecutor” dilemma is for all sides to renounce the use of political power in spiritual matters, but Milton won't go so far. Note that his title deliberately echoes that of an Isocrates speech

calling for the restoration of the council of the Areopagus in Athens—an aristocratic body that was anything but the representative of unlimited freedom.

Now what aspects of the Areopagus council Milton particularly admires is not altogether clear. But Isocrates' speech bemoans the degeneration of Athenian democracy into something less than admirable. Somehow, the restoration of some powers to the experienced, well-vetted statesman of the Areopagus council would move Athens closer to “polity,” that form of rule by the many that Aristotle considered rare, but most positive.

In his reading of the classics, Milton would certainly have picked up the idea that the Areopagus Council represented a careful, scrupulous approach to decision-making more likely to produce a just result than the huge popular juries of Athens with their sunup-to-sundown trials.

So does Milton have a particular governmental process in mind, something that might serve as a check to a parliament determined to behave as tyrannically as the king in religious affairs? In *Areopagitica* itself, he calls for no more than for parliament to return to its former more tolerant ways and be willing to reconsider their position—a privilege reserved (he says) for the “greatest and wisest men.” But he doesn't at all insist on post-publication freedom of the press. Apparently, careful deliberation of wise men may deem that a book is in fact a bad one, undeserving of protection.

And, curiously enough, Milton does not seem to consider the possibility that the book he is trying to defend (his argument for more liberal divorce law) could easily be regarded as a very bad book indeed.

In the event, the Presbyterian controlled parliament was unpersuaded—and only with Oliver Cromwell's rump parliament did Independents (like Milton) get the tolerance they had looked for. And Cromwell, is, by the way, the personification of the paradox of toleration. “I

beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken,” Cromwell urges his Scottish opponents. Let us reason together: we can work things out. But in Ireland, there would be no reasoning together.

The same intolerance of Catholicism that led to Cromwell’s extreme Irish policy followed Milton to the end of his life. His last work, “On the True Religion” (1673), treats Lutherans, Calvinists, Anabaptists, Socinians and Arminians charitably. Their differences result only from misunderstandings: all are true Christians nevertheless, not heretics. Catholicism’s claim to political as well as spiritual supremacy makes it the real heresy: the source of division within the church.

Milton recommends a multi-pronged strategy for dealing with the Catholics. Study the scripture. Treat tolerantly Protestants who don’t agree with you. Clean up your moral life.

Milton reminds his readers of Paul’s warning about how immorality clouds the understanding, “For this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believe not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.”

He reminds them too of Isaiah’s similar warning to Israel, “They have not known nor understood, for he hath shut their eyes that they cannot see, and their hearts that they cannot understand.”

Without moral reform, England is headed to disaster:

Let us, therefore, using this last means, last here spoken of, but first to be done, amend our lives with all speed; lest through impenitency we run into that stupidity which we now seek all means so warily to avoid, the worst of superstitions, and the heaviest of all God’s judgments, popery.

Here too, Milton's anti-Catholicism is related partly to circumstances. The Cavalier parliament of the Restoration had given the Anglicans the upper-hand, and in the 1660's, the less tolerant wing of the Anglican constituency had imposed restrictions on both non Catholics and dissenters, e.g., the Clarendon codes and specifically anti-Quaker legislation. Once again, the executive power (in this case, Charles II) had preferred a more tolerant, more inclusive policy and In 1662 and again in 1672—while parliament was out of session—Charles issued indulgence declarations, trying to aid both Catholics and non-conformists. Parliament was going to have none of this and insisted on enforcing an established Anglicanism. Quakers in particular had a hard time of it. By James Tully's estimate, 15,000 Quakers were fined, imprisoned, or exiled—and 450 put to death (p. 6). Desperate times call for desperate measures, and perhaps Milton thinks Satan can cast out Satan. Maybe an appeal to anti-Catholic bigotry might stop anti-nonconformist bigotry.

By the 1680's, England had gone through 150 years of religious shifts with Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Independents all going through times of persecution. And whenever a persecuted group got the upper-hand, it turned persecutor itself—though never with much success at stifling opposition. No matter who took over, religious dissent continued, and dissenters always created enough disruption to the newly-established order that persecution seemed (at least partially) justified.

It is this situation Locke laments at the beginning of his First Letter Concerning Toleration. "There had been plenty of arguments for toleration from the persecuted," says Locke, "but the wrong sort of arguments to truly resolve the toleration dilemma." Usually, persecuted

groups got no farther than defending their own immediate interests, and toleration ceases to concern them should they take control themselves:

“The defenders of persecuted groups,” says Locke, “typically approach religious disputes with softness and civility, and they are content to resort to ‘strong Arguments’ and ‘good Reason’” (33). But when court-favor gives them the upper hand, “Peace and Charity are to be laid aside” (33).

Where they have the Power to carry on Persecution, and to become Master, there they desire to live upon fair Terms, and preach up Toleration. When they are not strengthened with the Civil Power, then they can bear most patiently, and unmovedly, the Contagion of Idolatry, Superstition, and Heresie.

And since, once in power, every different sect succumbs to the same pathology, Locke argues that it’s time for a brand new, far broader, approach to the whole issue.

Now Locke himself came rather late to the tolerationist side. Believing that true Christianity was a matter of the heart rather than externals, debates about forms of worship seemed to him rather beside the point. The tolerance debates of the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century had tended to draw distinctions between indifferent points and what was essential to salvation. Those arguing for tolerance drew the conclusion most of us would draw: if a thing is indifferent, leave it to the individual.

But Thomas Hobbes and others had a different take. Jesus makes it very clear that true religion is a matter of the heart: it is not what is on the outside that counts. Since the externals do not matter to God, they should not matter to the Christian either. But the externals of religion are very important in creating the unity that a magistrate might find extraordinarily useful. And

since externals do not matter to God or to the individual seeking salvation and they do matter to the magistrate—well, why should the magistrate not impose whatever externals he wants?

In the early 1660's, Locke was making a similar case for deference to royal authority in religion. But in the same way he shifts from distrust of parliament to a defense of parliamentary prerogative, he shifts his religious position as well. He completely rejects the idea that compulsion is of any value at all to the spread of the gospel:

That any Man should think fit to cause another Man whose Salvation he heartily desires, to expire in Torment and that even in an unconverted estate, would, I confess, seem very strange to me, and I think, to any other also.

Religious toleration goes hand in hand with true Christian faith:

The Toleration of those that differ from others in Matters of Religion, is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine Reason of Mankind, that it seems monstrous for Men to be so blind, as not to perceive the Necessity and Advantage of it in so clear a light.

So why so little toleration? Is it the fault of Christianity itself? If all the “Factions, Tumults, and Civil Wars” did spring from Christianity, says Locke, then Christianity would be the worst of all religions (p. 54). But this, says Locke couldn't be the case: Christianity is the most modest and peaceable religion of all.

So wherein lies the problem?

The Heads and Leaders of the Church, moved by Avarice and insatiable desire of Dominion, making use of the immoderate Ambition of Magistrates, and the credulous Superstition of the giddy Multitude, have incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves; by preaching unto them...that Schismatics and Hereticks are to

be outed of their Possession, and destroyed. And thus have they mixed together and confounded two things that are themselves most different, the Church and the Commonwealth (55).

Mixing church and state corrupts both. Punishing those that deviate for the official religious line secures for the magistrate a core of zealous supporters who remain loyal even when he behaves tyrannically. The “orthodox” religious (especially the leaders) secure for themselves unmerited position and power. And those who are oppressed, understandably resort to force to secure the natural rights they have lost. As long as the principle of persecution for religion prevails, civil turmoil is inevitable. But if only church and state would keep within their own spheres, discord would cease.

How far can religious liberty be safely extended? To Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Armenians, Quakers—and beyond.

Neither Pagan, nor Mahumeton, nor Jew ought to be excluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth because of his Religion (54).

And Locke seems ready to advocate acceptance of Catholicism as well. “Is it permitted to worship God in the Roman manner?” he asks. “Let it be permitted to do it in the Geneva form also” (55).

But while neither religious belief nor practice is grounds for denying religious liberty, adhering to a religion that leaves its proper sphere and usurps civil power is a problem:

It is ridiculous for anyone to profess himself to be a Mahumetan only in his Religion, but in everything else a faithful Subject or a Christian Magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who is himself intirely obedient to the Ottoman emperor (50).

The magistrate cannot tolerate those who transfer their political allegiance to an outside authority: Catholic allegiance to the Pope is an obstacle.

Atheism, too, is destructive of the civil order since effective civil contracts must be ultimately sacred contracts, guaranteed by religious oath. Further, those without religion have no grounds to claim the privilege of tolerance (51).

Now it is here, one would think, Locke would have to deal with the paradox of tolerance, a place where he would have to spend quite a bit of time explaining his exceptions to the general principle. But, careful, meticulous thinker that he, for some reason a few cursory paragraphs are sufficient.

Why?

Tolerance for us is often close to indifference about religious issues, an ever-expanding list of non-essentials. Lockean tolerance was something rather different. He often did dismiss ideas and practices others held dear as non-essential, but he was convinced that there were a few clear essentials to the Christian faith.

In *The Reasonableness of Christianity* and elsewhere, Locke argues that Christianity is unquestionably true, and its essential beliefs accessible to all whether learned or not. Yes, there were truths hard to be understood, but there would be no profit in imposing such beliefs (unessential as they were) on anyone—and even the greatest thinkers after a lifetime of study might not come to consensus on these issues anyway.

As to the essential truths, since they were clear and accessible even to the most untrained minds, force was needless. All these ideas needed was a fair opportunity in the marketplace of ideas.



Suppose one went to the store for apples and found two bins. One had good, wholesome, fresh, delicious apples. The other was filled with worm-eaten, rotten apples. Locke believed that, just as consumers free to choose would pick good apples over rotten apples, they would, if free to choose, pick the true religion over anything else.

Only they won't and don't.

When Locke published his *Letter Concerning Toleration* All Souls College chaplain and arch-Anglican Jonas Proast responded with an able counter-argument about the absurdity of the kind of toleration Locke advocated, and for the next 14 years or so, Proast and Locke exchanged a back-and-forth conversation with Locke writing more than 300 pages trying to defend points in his original 60 page essay! And it is in these pages that Locke confronts what, for him, must have been the true paradox of tolerance.

Locke insists again and again that salvation can only come through a freely chosen embrace of the truths of the gospel. He has to constantly concede Proast's point that most people will make bad and costly choices. Nevertheless, he insists that compulsion will make things no better. Proast argues, for instance, that magistrate action is key in spreading the true faith. Locke responds:

Because the magistrates of the world, being few of them in the right way; not one of ten, take which side you will, perhaps not one of a hundred, being of the true religion; it is likely your indirect way of using force would do a hundred, or at least ten times as much harm as good (3<sup>rd</sup> Letter Concerning Toleration).

And, in the end, Locke argues that, when it comes to religion, men must be free to choose even when you know full well that their choices are likely to be wrong. Perhaps a great enough author might write a poem along those lines.

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## The Nature of Identity: Carlyle and Lawrence

Brooke Nelson, Northern State University

The debate as to whether every individual possesses a single inner identity or if every person's identity is simply just a collection of various social masks still remains an ongoing discussion today. This debate in turn results in yet another question: if the latter were to be true, can any person truly be known? By looking into various works from prominent authors of the last couple centuries, a possible answer and explanation can be found; yes, people do have a collection of social masks, but these social masks are not created out of thin air. They are created and molded by their single, inner identity for varying social situations. Thus, becoming acquainted and actually coming to know someone's inner identity is possible by going through several steps, but attempts made are not always successful.

To understand the difference, the creation, and the relationship between one's inner identity and the social masks that modify it, one must first understand the difference between the appearance and the reality. Thomas Carlyle's fiction/autobiography/essay/short story *Sartor Resartus* considers this idea when discussing the nature and the necessity of religion. Carlyle sums up his conclusions and ideas in what he describes as "The Philosophy of Clothes"; *The Norton Anthology's* headnote for Thomas Carlyle states, "In effect this Clothes Philosophy is an attempt to demonstrate the difference between the appearances of things and their reality" (1047-48). Religion, the appearance, is in his view, transitory. Religion is used to describe the beliefs of the time, and when beliefs change, the religion must be discarded in exchange for a belief system that better reflects what the people believe. This is unlike faith, which Carlyle views as reality. Faith is the consistent form and idea that influences each religion and gives them shape. Carlyle's philosophy can also be applied to the discussion of identity. The social masks every individual possesses are the equivalent to his philosophy's statement toward religion; both the

social masks and religion are created and exchanged to project a certain image or idea based on the will of the reality, the inner identity or faith, beneath it.

Being as the lone inner identity is the origin of one's self, it is the inner identity who creates the social masks. *The Norton Anthology's* headnote for Thomas Carlyle supports this idea by stating, "The appearance of an individual depends on the costume" (1047-48). The body is created before the costume, because without a body, there is no need for a costume. The body is unable to miraculously change in order to fit into a piece of clothing. Thus, the costume is created for the body. So, just as the body is incapable of executing such a feat, the inner identity is incapable of conforming to the numerous social masks. Just as this analogy suggest, the social masks one wears are fitted and molded by one's inner identity.

From this, one can gather the relationship between the appearance and the reality; one simply does not exist or operate without the other. Each of them functions with the other to strike a necessary balance. No matter how many masks or costumes, as the previously mentioned quote exemplifies, are donned, the reality will always continue to exist beneath the many layers. In "*Sartor Resartus*" Carlyle describes humanity's need for the reality, faith:

In our Friend's words, 'that, for man's well-being, Faith is properly the one thing needful; how, with it, Martyrs, otherwise weak, can cheerfully endure the shame and the cross; and without it, Worldlings puke-up their sick existence, by suicide, in the midst of luxury': to such it will be clear that, for a pure moral nature, the loss of his religious Belief was the loss of everything. (Carlyle 1049)

According to Carlyle, "Worldlings", people, cannot exist without the reality, whether it be faith or an inner identity. Even those who seem to have everything a person could ever want, would perish from the lack of a true reality.

This concept is similar for reality's need for appearance. No matter how many masks or costumes are taken away, the reality may still exist. but its function is hindered. In order to thrive, some alterations must be made to the reality. Imagine, speaking to one's superiors the way one speaks to a close friend, not the wisest decision. Most likely the result would not be positive. Therefore, a social mask is applied to the reality in order to appeal to figures of authority. Though each serves different functions, both the appearance and the reality are needed.

Sorting through an individual's plentiful social masks requires, not only the time necessary to navigate several stages of becoming acquainted, but also compliance from the other individual. When we first become acquainted with others, we are met with a generalized mask. Not wanting to come off too strong or be viewed in a negative light, a generalized mask serves as a fairly blank, inoffensive canvas, which the individual can then use as a means of determining which relationship category the recently met individual belongs in. The generalized social masks are, generally speaking, a diluted version of the single, inner identity. By determining others' responses to the generalized mask, he or she then decides what type of relationship the two will have: a professional relationship, an acquaintanceship, a friendship, a close friendship, a romantic relationship, etc. Depending on how they choose to categorize, depends on how successful one might be at getting to know his or her inner identity. Their success depends on the categorization of the relationship because their categorization determines which mask they will be confronted with next. The masks are measured on a continuum as to how much each of the masks resemble the inner identity. The closer the nature of the relationship, the closer the mask is to the individual's inner identity. Then, over time, the mask steadily becomes less diluted and more like the inner identity that resides beneath it until there is only the single, true identity remaining.

While eventually gaining access to another's inner identity is the ideal outcome, it is not always the outcome that actually takes place. For one can put in as much time and effort as one wishes, but that is not necessarily indicative of imminent success. This failed effort is due to the fact that a relationship of any sort is between two consenting individuals. The other must comply and be willing to allow their social masks to fade and eventually become nonexistent in the presence of the other chosen individual. If even of the individual is acquiescent, then there is a probable chance that some essence of a mask will remain.

Events such as the above may even take place between people who share an intimate relationship like marriage. An example of this would be in D. H. Lawrence's *Odour of Chrysanthemums*. In this short story, Elizabeth Bates discovers, after her husband's untimely death, that she never truly knew her husband, "Her soul died in her for fear: she knew she had never seen him, he had never seen her... And now she saw, and turned silent in seeing. For she had been wrong. She said he was something he was not" (2495). From the way she refers to him solely as "my husband" or "your father" instead of his name, Walter, most can determine that she did not actually know her husband as a real person, just a distant figure with a title. Because of this, Elizabeth came to familiarize herself with two of his masks, "my husband" and "their father". Additionally, at some point in their marriage, she had rejected his inner identity, "She had denied him what he was--she saw it now. She had refused him as himself" (2495). Instead of acknowledging her husband's inner identity, she chose to see him only as a series of masks.

But, as was stated earlier, relationships take place between two people. So while the wife now realizes that she played a large part in the disintegration of their relationship, she also admits that neither of them knew the other:



She felt that in the next world he would be a stranger to her. If they met there, in the beyond, they would only be ashamed of what had been before. The children had come, for some mysterious reason, out of both of them. But the children did not unite them. Now he was dead, she knew how eternally he was apart from her, how eternally he had nothing more to do with her. She saw this episode of her life closed. They had denied each other in life. How he had withdrawn. An anguish came over her. It was finished then: it had become hopeless between them long before he died. Yet he had been her husband. But how little! (Lawrence 2496)

Elizabeth was not the only one in their relationship to neglect the other. Both her and her husband failed to see the other for who they truly were, their inner identities. They may have come to know each other when they were first married, but over time, the masks overtook their identities and their marriage went sour. Because they did not truly know one another, Elizabeth believes that if they were to meet again in the afterlife, she and Walter would hardly recognize each other and would begin to feel ashamed of what their relationship became, barely a marriage.

From all of this compiled textual evidence, one can come to the conclusion that people do have a collection of social masks, but that these masks are created and molded by a single, inner identity. And though one may go through the necessary steps to try and gain access to another's inner identity, one may not always be successful in one's attempts.

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## Men “Brought Up of Nought”: Comparing Class Structure in *Le Morte D’Arthur* and BBC’s *Merlin*

Emilee Ruhland, North Dakota State University

Though film adaptations of Arthurian material have proven quite popular in the last decade, there are much fewer instances of popular television adaptations. A quick glance at Wikipedia would show that only French television show *Kaamelott* and BBC’s *Merlin* were able to continue past a first season. The BBC’s series powered its way through five series, ending in 2012. Their approach was decidedly ‘Young Adult’ in nature, with young main characters doing what Tison Pugh and Angela Jane Weisl define as, quote, “attempting to find themselves in the confusion of the world around them, seeking their own voices and visions.”

The British show challenges accepted beliefs of British class structure by romanticizing social mobility in a way that is reminiscent of the American Dream. After I introduce a brief *Merlin* background and establish its place as an adaptation, I will argue that just as Sir Thomas Malory’s *Le Morte D’Arthur* reflects a medieval ideology of social mobility and class, *Merlin* responds to modern British ideology and uses an imaginary Middle Ages to call into question and reflect the morals and class structure of contemporary British society.

Described as a “land of myth and a time of magic,” Merlin protects Arthur Pendragon from perils and faces his own adventures as well. Merlin is a teenager serving as Prince Arthur’s manservant, hiding his magic because the practice of magic is against the law. The two young men face all sorts of dangers together: assassins wishing to kill the royal family, sorcerers looking for revenge, mythical beasts running rampant. In the face of danger, Arthur looks to courage and strength to defeat the problem, while Merlin secretly uses his magic and intellect. As Merlin and Arthur fight mythical beasts and evil warlocks, they also grapple with

their unlikely friendship, which grows over the seasons and rests in uneasy tension due to the restrictive class system of Camelot.

Though there are many indicators that *Merlin* is an adaptation, BBC has not claimed any specific primary text as their inspiration. When discussing the relationship between film and literature adaptations, Brian McFarlane addresses questions of adaptation inadequacies by claiming that an adapted film's success should not be dependent on its 'success' as an adaptation. While it is important to consider their relationship, the way content is handled should not be judged via the 'who came first' argument. When considering a film adaptation of a legend, of bits and pieces rather than a whole, singular text, it makes much more sense to consider *how* anachronisms are used, rather than the accuracy of the film—because no film, with their Hollywood lights and inauthentic accents, will ever produce an 'accurate' portrayal of the Middle Ages.

The definition of authenticity in relation to medieval adaptations is thus dependent on the type of lens applied to film as well as on the focus of the research. When considering a text's authenticity, Rebecca Barnhouse believes in getting "the facts right," and "present[ing] *all* of their characters as authentically medieval" (53). However, Pugh and Weisl argue that this leads her to miss that "perhaps in its construction of a past that can speak to and incorporate the values of the present...literature about the Middle Ages is at its most authentically medieval." (56). Though they both use the term authenticity, we can see how their definitions contrast. Whereas Barnhouse looks for historical accuracy when confirming a text's authenticity, Pugh and Weisl consider a text authentic when it successfully speaks to contemporary audiences from a medieval backdrop. Pugh and Weisl believe, as McFarlane does, that no text will be an exact or literally authentic portrayal of the Middle Ages, but they also believe that a kind of authenticity can be

reached if an imaginary Middle Ages incorporates these contemporary problems and values. If we take Pugh and Weisl's definition of authenticity, then BBC's *Merlin* is not "authentic" because of its portrayal of medieval tropes or success as an adaptation. What does make it authentic, however, is its inclusion of contemporary problems and its ability to connect the past with this present. *Merlin*'s incorporation of mythical creatures, druids, and sorcerers strains any consideration of modern 'authenticity'. However, the use of myth and magic are not nearly as critical or anachronistic as their use of modern ideologies of social mobility in a medieval age.

One anachronism Pugh and Weisl approve of is a creative anachronism, "reflect[ing] on the present moment through the past." Creative anachronisms are present in *Merlin* throughout, but perhaps most in the creation of a Guinevere who is a servant in Camelot but feels secure and confident enough in her position to reprimand Prince Arthur when he is inconsiderate and rude.

GWEN: You don't have any idea, do you?

ARTHUR: About what?

GWEN: About how rude and arrogant you can be! This is my home and you are my guest in it! I know you are used to more luxurious quarters, but that is not an excuse to be so rude! You claim titles don't matter to you, but you behave like a prince and expect me to wait on you like a servant! Saying it means nothing if your actions betray you! Would it kill you to say please and thank you once in a while?! My Lord.

Arthur responds to Guinevere's outburst with an ashamed and sincere apology and even decides to make dinner for her. One of the most evident scenes in which Arthur apologizes in *Morte Darthur* is when Arthur realizes that Balyn is "a passynge good man of hys hondys [hands] and

of hys dedis [deeds],” virtuous and “without velony,” and releases him from imprisonment (Malory 40). Soon after the apology, Balyn murders a guest of Arthur and is banished.

In this way, *Merlin* and *Morte Darthur* are simultaneously similar and unlike—In *Morte Darthur*, Arthur locked up Balyn for murdering a man and apologized because he proved himself worthy by relieving the damesell of her cursed sword. However, Arthur’s one apology to a commoner is seen as a negative event due to Balyn’s inability to retain his honor. In *Merlin*, Arthur’s apology follows his own unruly behavior, rather than another’s supposed behavior. In addition, his apology is followed by more trust between the two of them, and a better understanding of those who live with less than he does.

Because of the situation surrounding the apology, *Merlin*’s version of Arthur is much more “modern”. BBC’s Arthur transcends class, gender, and race to apologize to Guinevere. Whereas John Aberth reasons that inaccuracies may be overlooked if the “overall vision of the film remains true” to the Middle Ages, Pugh and Weisl encourage anachronisms if the final product is one that is reflective of our own cultural values, rather than purely of medieval ideology. *Merlin* is both a reflection of British class and a push for more social mobility, joining a time period and legendary hero known for their links to class restriction with the complex contemporary ideology of the U.K. and the United States.

When Malory completed *Morte Darthur* near the beginning of 1470, Henry the VI had just been restored to the throne, but he had lost most of his support and soon after was murdered by Edward IV (Malory xxii). Thus, there was plenty of discord with the political world, and, as Sarah L. Peverly writes in her article, many considered Henry VI’s failures to be connected to his corrupt advisors, and began using the term “brought up of nought” to signify (in a negative connotation) those of lower status.

There are multiple occurrences of men “brought up of nought” in *Morte Darthur*, and Peverly claims that Malory reasserts a traditional social order. Nobility crowds the pages, in the forms of Kings, Queens, knights, and sons or daughters of the above. In Malory’s treatment of class, nobles, mostly knights, pose as commoners on numerous occasions (whether purposefully or unknowingly), and they are faced with an overwhelming amount of criticism.

Although knights often pose as commoners in order to prove themselves, and thus bestow upon the rank of commoner a type of freedom, they are likewise belittled by that same social class, the bourgeoisie, or knights. When Gareth, son of King Lot of Orkney, poses as a kitchen boy, knights like Sir Kay sneer at him, and even Lancelot, who treats him equally, still demands to know his lineage before he will grant Gareth a knighthood. Malory’s Arthur comes perilously close to paralleling the mistakes of Henry VI; on his wedding day, Arthur is asked to bestow a knighthood to Torre, a poor man’s son. Though he declares this a “grete thyng” to be asked of, the King senses that Torre would make a good knight (Malory 64). After knighting Torre, Arthur asks Merlin if he did the right thing

“Now, Merlion,” seyde Arthure, “whethir thys Torre shall be a goode man?”

“Yee, hardely, sir, he ought to be a good man, for he ys com of good kynrede as ony on lyve—and of kynges bloode.”

“How so, sir?” seyde the Kyng. “I shall telle you,” seyde Merlion. “Thys poore man Aryes the cowherd ys nat his fadir, for he ys no sybbe to hym; for Kyng Pellynore ys hys fadir.” (64)

In raising a man “brought up from nought,” a commoner, Arthur risks corruption, just as many accused Henry VI of corrupted advisors. Arthur in effect ‘saves face’ when Merlin solves the

problem of a cowherd's son as a knight, and is restored in his nobility. Thus, in *Morte Darthur* nobility is something that can—perhaps even needs to—be earned, but what becomes obvious is that only the noble can earn nobility. While Sir Tor was unaware of his birthright, many other nobles deliberately disguise their identity; after losing a fight to Gawain, Sir Priamus is relieved to find out that the previously disguised Gawain is indeed a knight of the Round Table; Gareth's disguise as a kitchen boy lends to his mistreatment; Sir Marhalte refuses to fight with Trystrams initially, until Trystrams reveals that he is of royal blood.

Just as *Morte Darthur* emphasizes the importance of noble knights, King Uther from *Merlin* relies on The First Code of Camelot. Merlin, after seeing Lancelot fight for the first time, asks Arthur to make him a knight. Arthur reminds him of the code:

ARTHUR: That's great, Merlin. I'm sure he's terrific, but you forget the First Code of Camelot.

MERLIN: The what?

ARTHUR: The First Code. Only those of noble blood can serve as knights. So, unless your friend is a nobleman...

To Uther, only a nobleman is fitted to serve as a knight. Uther represents the medieval ideology of a restrictive class system, and Arthur serves as the catalyst for a new ideology of equality and nobility of all. Near the end of the episode, Arthur has seen what Lancelot can do and how he acts, and stands up for him against Uther.

ARTHUR: He laid down his life for me! He served with honour.

UTHER: I see you feel strongly about this, Arthur. Under the circumstances? A pardon, perhaps.



ARTHUR: No, not good enough, Father. You must restore Lancelot to his rightful place, as a knight of Camelot.

UTHER: Never. The law is the law. The Code bends for no man.

ARTHUR: Then the Code is wrong!

Arthur comes to care for those who are “noble of heart,” rather than noble by blood. Arthur surrounds himself with those noble of heart; in “The Coming of Arthur, Part II,” Arthur knights Lancelot, Percival, and Elyan, who are all commoners, and Gwaine, who is noble but poses as a commoner.

In addition to his “noble of heart” knights, the two most important people to Arthur are servants: Merlin, his manservant, and Guinevere, a servant who eventually becomes his wife. Merlin arrives in Camelot and instantly finds himself at odds with Arthur, but when he saves his life he is granted the position of manservant to Arthur. Though they start out unhappy with the situation, they grow closer and eventually Merlin becomes one of Arthur’s most trusted friends. Likewise, Guinevere slowly gains Arthur’s trust with her honesty and friendship, which grows into an (mostly) equal and considerate relationship.

This is at odds with Malory’s vision of nobility. While Malory condemned Henry VI for raising men of lower status to higher posts, *Merlin* actually idealizes bringing men from lower statuses, provided they have earned their title. In this way, noble ideology has been completely reversed.

Guinevere, a biracial maidservant for the Lady Morgana, is one of the few commoners who stands up to Arthur. Before her outburst about his manners as a houseguest in “The Once and Future Queen” (series 2, episode 3), she points out his rude behavior towards the town of Ealdor, where Merlin’s mother lives in “The Moment of Truth” (series 1, episode 10):

GWEN: Arthur, Hunith made you some food.

ARTHUR: Thanks.

[Gwen turns to leave]

ARTHUR (mutter): I think.

[Gwen stops and turns back around]

GWEN: Food is scarce for these people, you shouldn't turn your nose up at it!

[Arthur stares at her.]

GWEN: Oh, no. I—I shouldn't have spoken to you like that. I'm sorry.

Until this moment, Guinevere treats the Pendragon family with cautious respect, as people of higher importance. For the first time, Guinevere treats Arthur as an equal, rather than someone of the upper class, and it catches both of them by surprise. Though Uther condemns this behavior, Arthur is grateful for Guinevere's honesty. Especially after "The Once and Future Queen" episode, the audience begins to see Arthur gradually transition into a kind, compassionate leader worthy of the title "The Once and Future King," mostly because of Guinevere and Merlin, his supposed inferiors. These two episodes mark a move to a more romantic relationship, a forbidden love that, under Uther's rule, can never happen.

When Arthur and his companions strive to be seen as more than just a stereotype, when they work to break the mold of Camelot's restrictive social structure, that social structure, its inhabitants, and the audience watching question their identity. Just as John M. Ganim considered the idea of the imagined Middle Ages a reaction to the West's identity crisis, *Merlin* questions British culture through characters like Merlin and Guinevere. Uther, the symbol of

medieval ideology, also symbolizes the ‘contemporary’ British restrictions declining as royalty that represent social mobility, like Arthur, begin to take a larger role.

Audie Cornish, host of *All Things Considered*, discussed the rise of the British Dream with *Planet Money* co-host Adam Davidson. As Davidson explains, after 1970 the U.K. began to pull ahead of the U.S. in economic mobility. It has always been the idea that Americans have an undeniable right to fashion themselves into what they desire, “rather than simply making do with the identity” handed them. Though British class restriction began to give way in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, many articles tout the American Dream as an example to hold the U.K. accountable, to make social mobility more realistic for all of their citizens. Either way, *Merlin* reflects the extreme social changes taking place in the U.K.

In series 3, Arthur and Guinevere are still unable to cross social boundaries; Arthur sees Guinevere speaking to Gwaine and becomes jealous:

ARTHUR: They seem very friendly!

MERLIN: Why should you care?

ARTHUR: I don’t.

ARTHUR: She could do better than that!

MERLIN: What? She should be setting her sights...higher?

[Arthur shrugs.]

MERLIN: Oh, but I forget! She can’t. A girl of Gwen’s standing, no. She could never consort with a nobleman. That’s the rules.

[Arthur glares at Merlin.]

Merlin's teasing dips into a serious matter; Merlin treats it as a joke, as though Arthur can do whatever he'd like and marry Guinevere immediately, but under Uther's rule, it cannot happen. It is only after Uther dies that Arthur and Guinevere finally marry. Guinevere starts as a servant, but by the end of series 4, she becomes the Queen of Camelot. Though she and Arthur marry for love, it is not this love that allows her to step into the role of Queen. Instead, her perseverance, loyalty, benevolence, and—most importantly—her ability to empathize and relate to the 'commoners' make her ideal for the role.

Though they have some liberties of movement, for the most part *Merlin's* characters are in a restricted social structure during Uther's reign. Once Arthur takes command, the people begin to accept equality. When Sir Lancelot, Sir Elyan, Sir Percival, and Sir Gwaine are inducted as knights at the christening of the Round Table, and Guinevere's place as Queen is secured, Camelot truly begins to see itself as a society free from rigidity. Social mobility is encouraged rather than smothered. Perhaps Guinevere's identity as a biracial servant who can become a queen is imaginary and not possible in medieval times, but it is ultimately most authentic due to its relevance to contemporary culture. Thus, watching *Merlin*, and many other medieval adaptations, the Western identity crisis Ganim discusses begins resolving itself for the U.K. by creating a British Dream, giving individuals both the ability and yearning to climb to the top and claim an identity matching their hopes and dreams.

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## Mismatched Pairs: Of Shoes and Sex in Plato and Dekker

Kevin Andrew Spicer, University of St. Francis

Thomas Dekker's *The Shoemaker's Holiday* is a festive, Saturnalian cross-section of early modern England. Nobles and couriers, lowly shoemakers and tailors, spin and whirl in a humorously phantasmagoric romp of money and class warfare, love and artificiality. The play is bookended by war of all kinds: war between England and France, war between courtiers and merchants, wars of rhetoric and poetry. All of this is well-known to any cursory reading—and the secondary literature continues to grow and investigate this intriguing work. However, there is a bit of a lacuna with regards to this cross-section of society. Plenty of ink has been put towards the role of the shoemaker in this play—for good and obvious reasons; yet there is a philosophical line of thought that relates to this “gentle craft” of shoemaking that is Platonic in nature. The argument needs to be made that the figure of the shoemaker is not just a simple choice of realism on Dekker's part—it goes much deeper than that. Furthermore, the figure of the shoemaker in Plato's *Republic* gives one much to think about with regards to a number of issues in the play: the role of the artisan in a just society, the matter of deception and its relation to society, the issue of excess (both economic and sexual), and even to the Socratic “good lie” of politics. Unfortunately, as numerous scholars have noted, *The Shoemaker's Holiday* is a nice respite from the horrors of war; yet, it is not just the war's absent presence in the background that causes one to question the drama as a form of escapism. The play's world suffers from the very same problems that plagued Plato's own utopic vision of society and politics.

As everyone no doubt remembers, Book II of Plato's *Republic* begins with Socrates's imaginative creation of a State—with the goal of ultimately trying to determine precisely what is meant by words like “justice” and “injustice.” Socrates tells us that what we need for a State seems simple enough. The first great necessity is food, of course. “The second is a dwelling,

and the third clothing and the like.” The fourth thing required starts to get a little tricky, as Socrates says, “And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?” Adeimantus agrees with Socrates that this is a good start—as Socrates has asserted that “[t]he barest notion of a State must include four or five men.” The figure of the shoemaker thus appears here in all its ambiguity: a nascent State requires a small number—“[f]our or five, we do not know exactly,” as Jacques Ranciere puts it at the beginning of his *The Philosopher and his Poor*.

Ranciere is interested in this peculiar figure of the shoemaker—is he fourth or the fifth on the list? does it matter?—because it fundamentally serves as somewhat of a stumbling block for a vision of society and justice where everyone—accepting the “noble lie”—follows the trade and role that is most consistent with their “nature”: warriors are warriors, kings are kings, philosophers are philosophers, shoemakers are nothing other than shoemakers. Ranciere actually argues that Plato views the shoemaker as one of the exemplary figures in Socrates’s story who encapsulates what is really at stake in their conception of justice: “The shoemaker truly must be nothing other than a shoemaker ... A shoemaker is simply a man who is forbidden to engage in any activity other than shoemaking.” Shoemakers, specifically, are the ones who are not allowed to pass themselves off as anything but shoemakers. The ingenuity of Ranciere’s reading may have much to do with noticing what a strange character the shoemaker is in the *Republic*. Socrates’s denunciation of the painter and the poet are commonplace—but the shoemaker?—what’s the problem with him, exactly? For Ranciere—and this is a path I’m not certain he traces out fully—the shoemaker is exemplary of a particular excess. Ranciere does not utilize this word explicitly, but it is one that I myself would like to use. As mentioned just a



moment ago, *The Philosopher and his Poor* notes that in Socrates's listing of professions needed for "the barest notion of a State"—the shoemaker is the last on this list of four or five. The syntax of the list makes clear this ambiguity over the discrete number required to have a society—and the coordinating conjunction suggests the list is on the verge of proliferating quite rapidly. Indeed, this is, of course, what happens: we need farmers, carpenters, weavers for clothing, and then shoemakers—but then, Socrates asks, "will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want ..." The "four or five" seems to want to forestall this proliferation of professions conjured into existence by human desire. The indeterminacy, at first, over the number of people required thus suggests the necessity of making sure—right here at the origin with only three professions named—that there is a proper ordering of the division of labor.

Of course, the shoemaker could be a kind of pure excess—a kind of purely useless profession. As Plato puts it in the lines right before the "four or five" remark, he writes: "We may suppose that one is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants." Again, the conjunction here is clear: the shoemaker is named—but he is named only to seem to fall into a larger category of artisans all of whom would be largely equal. If someone can weave clothing together, might they not also be able to make a pair of shoes as well? The shoemaker would thus be a kind of redoubling of the third necessary profession—the tailor or the weaver. So, the shoemaker: contiguously connected, syntactically, to the excess of desire in a state—and, simultaneously, potentially a useless repetition, totally redundant and totally unnecessary. Ranciere argues that this figure—although a very strange one—serves a very key function in Plato's discourse: "The fact is that at every strategic point in the dialogue—

whenever it becomes necessary to think about the division of labor, to establish difference in natures and aptitudes, or to define justice itself—the shoemaker will be there in the front line of the argument.” The excess thus teaches the necessity of proper, non-excessive ordering. As Ranciere puts it: “Justice exists only through the disordering of health and, as such, was already indirectly at work in the interplay of lacks, excesses, and fluctuations that were upsetting slightly the perfect equilibrium of the healthy city. Justice is the returning of healthy and useful workers to their specific place.”

Before I move on from the Greeks, I would like to take another tiny detour around the issue of excess. Partly my interest here is deeply selfish—Ranciere is obviously not trying to write a kind of history of the shoemaker in Ancient Greek Philosophy (though I really wish someone would do that, actually, given the irony that so many students of a teacher who went around barefoot seem quite obsessed with shoes and shoemakers). So, I’m working my way to Dekker, but I want to go through Aristotle and Shakespeare first—begging everyone’s patience, of course. Strangely enough, the figure of the shoemaker shows up again in Aristotle, specifically around the start of the Second Part of his *Peri Hermeneias* (*On Interpretation*). In Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s text, he discusses how predicates are assigned to a subject in order to form what he calls a “unity.” His examples of when this works are simple enough: predicating bipedality and animality to the human, etc. When these properties are combined together we can then say things like “Socrates is a bipedal animal” and they will be the equivalent of saying “Socrates is a man.” However, Aristotle tells us that, obviously, not just any combination of predicates will form a “unity”; and, his example here starts with the figure of the shoemaker: “... if a man is both good and a shoemaker, we cannot combine the two propositions and say simply that he is a good shoemaker ...” So, the lesson is simple enough: if we call a

man good and we call him a shoemaker, we cannot combine them to say he is a good shoemaker. Aristotle does notice that predicates can be indiscriminately and infinitely predicated of a subject—but this scenario results in the ensuing of “absurd consequences.” In other words, we can predicate subjects infinitely, but if not done properly we produce unities that are “linguistic” but not “real.” Now, it may be that Aristotle’s reasons for choosing the shoemaker here—as opposed to, say, a carpenter, a potter, or a musician—are completely unknowable. Moreover, this would mean trying to determine why he chooses it would result in a complete fool’s errand. I would like to try, just for a bit of fun, to see if something similar to Plato might be happening here with Aristotle—and the way I would like to do that is by obsessing about how closely connected these “linguistic” and not “real” unities are to the shoemaker example—and, also, how this concern with infinite predication through the explicitly *linguistic* system concerns this issue of excessiveness we saw with the help of Ranciere’s reading of Plato’s shoemaker.

The shoemaker figure here in Aristotle is used quite similarly to Plato: the example is here to show how absurdity needs to be properly corralled. We can predicate an infinite number of terms to the subject—but this is done only linguistically. Now, a way to illustrate this poetically is to go to Shakespeare, whose plays always portray such an infectious joy of perpetual play with precisely these linguistic unities. The spot I would like to go to is in Act II, Scene iii of *The Two Gentleman of Verona*—where Lance provides us with his hilarious allegory about having to leave his family in service to Proteus. Lance, as everyone knows, begins his story with a number of items, objects, at his disposal: a pair of shoes (and I’ll return to this, obviously), a walking staff, and his unforgettable dog, Crab. Lance takes these objects and attempts a series of substitutions: “This shoe is my father,” he says. “No, this left shoe is my

father; no, no, this left shoe is my mother. . . . This shoe, with the hole in it, is my mother” (II.iii.14-16, 17-18). He goes on: “[T]his staff is my sister, for, look you, she is as white as a lily and as small as a wand” (II.iii.19-21). Stephen Guy-Bray summarizes quite nicely what is happening here: “By drawing attention to the qualities in these props that make them suitable objects for dramatic representation, Lance only succeeds in focusing the audience’s attentions on the objects themselves. In pressing them into the service of his narrative, Lance deprives the objects of their function.” Although Guy-Bray does not mention it here, this deprivation is not single but multiple: in pulling the shoes out of their function (as shoes and staff), he attempts to press them into the wholly different function of narrative, but this second function never materializes either as he gets bogged down in the objects themselves (a coherent narrative is never achieved). There is also the further problem that Lance seems to pair up the objects with their allegorical counterparts sometimes based purely on resemblance (the shoe with the hole in it is his mother, his sister is as thin as a wand, etc.) and sometimes not. Again, as Guy-Bray puts it: “When things become important for themselves, when a character is distracted by the specific nature of his shoes, progress is impossible.” Of course, things get even more complicated when Lance tries to bring Crab into the picture; Lance is thinking about how to cast himself in this drama and he looks to the dog: “I am the dog—no, the dog is himself, and I am the dog—O! the dog is me and I am myself.” Determining which is the tenor and which is the vehicle, which is a metaphorical use of a word—like “dog” in this last instance—and which is not is admittedly difficult. Paul de Man was fond of noticing how linguistic systems often produced instances of what he called “vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration” when it came to determining the relation between a signifier and its reference; I can only imagine he might have had this example from Lance in mind.

Now, before I get back to the shoes—getting lost much like Lance—, I do want to resituate, again, where we are with regards to Plato and Aristotle. In Ranciere’s reading of Plato, the shoemaker is exempted—by fiat—from this play of substitution, this play of deception so often associated with the poet and the painter. Aristotle’s distinction between linguistic and real unities in the shoemaker example serves a similar purpose. If we do not make this distinction, we end up precisely where Lance is: very confused—am I the dog? No, the dog is himself, but I’m also the dog. In a really nice book by Bruce Bohner, entitled *Shakespeare and the Animals: Nature and Society in the Drama of Early Modern England*, he reads this scene with Lance and focuses specifically on Lance’s claim that “the dog is himself”—i.e. the dog is the dog—as follows:

... while the dog clearly “is himself” for all commonplace purposes, to make the dog be “himself” upon the stage is to ask him to participate in patterns of deliberate doubling of which any dog, by virtue of being a dog, is incapable. Crab is certainly himself—no one more contentedly so—but for that very reason Crab is unable to act himself, since acting involves an alienation from the persona being adopted, and that alienation, in turn, is a function of language. Being wholly “himself” and nothing other, Crab cannot perform himself, for performance is the province of imitation rather than identity.

In a scenario of such vertiginous substitutions, it seems risky to claim that “the dog *clearly* ‘is himself’.” Why assume that the dog is somehow exempted from this play of substitution, this play of *différance*, as Derrida would put it? To exempt the dog here from this play is to pull it out of the realm of Aristotle’s “linguistic unity” and into an alleged “real unity,” no longer subject to the trace and the play of difference. In fact, when exactly is a thing ever just itself? Indeed, in both Platonic and Shakespearean contexts here, we have two situations where

allegory and story are central—and when is anything within an allegory ever “just itself and nothing more”?

Lance’s solution vividly illustrates this infinite substitutability of the signifier. Keir Elam, many years ago, noted how Lance here illuminates a key semiotic fact: “Even though Launce tries to apply the principle of appropriateness or analagousness between representation and *representatum*, he inevitably discovers that the sign-vehicles are perfectly interchangeable.” It is this element of substitution that I would like to use to get us not only to Dekker, but back, as always, to Plato. For Plato, the shoemaker is just like one of Lance’s shoes—or his wand, or Crab. Ranciere unpacks this fact by noticing the shoemaker’s role within the story of justice is not one where he is “solely a shoemaker and nothing else.” Socrates, later in Book IV, asks Glaucon if one could, at the end of the day, substitute the shoemaker for the carpenter or vice versa; would it make any difference to the state? “Not much,” he replies. Thus, this very unique figure of the shoemaker isn’t all that unique after all; he is easily exchangeable, easily substitutable, just like the shoes he makes and the ones Lance allegorizes in his playing.

So, why take these Platonic, Aristotelian, and Shakespearean paths to get to Dekker? Well, for two reasons that have to do with the topics of language and sex as both of these things show themselves to be thoroughly fissured and cut through by substitution (in the case of semiotic interchangeability and in terms of the fetishizing possibilities of the shoe itself). Let me cover the language issue first. R. L. Smallwood, in his introduction to the Revels Plays’ edition of *The Shoemaker’s Holiday*, spends a great deal of time arguing for what I will not hesitate to call a highly Platonic view of language and its use by the main characters of the play. Although he himself does not make this claim explicitly, Smallwood’s introduction to the

Revel's Edition of the play proposes a strong case that Dekker's play is not only extremely aware of the class-divisions and class warfare between nobles and peasants, earls and shoemakers, but it is also aware of—and seems to call for—a similar kind of divisiveness and combativeness within language use itself. Even at the very start of the play, Sir Hugh Lacy, the Earl of London and Sir Roger Oatley, Lord Mayor of London, cannot manage to speak to one another amicably because the class differences between them “destroy the possibility of honest communication and mutual understanding: their conversation is founded on distrust, on sniping innuendo. Words are used dishonestly to mean more, or less, than they say.” Indeed, Smallwood describes the world and society of Dekker's play as a rather hellish place—at least as far as language is concerned—: in one case “the ordinary contact of honest discourse is denied them, for words can no longer be trusted”; in another the language “reveal[s] the sterility to which language can be reduced when it is used to break rather than forge links between human beings.” In case after case, language is misused and abused by all the characters—especially the rather silly lover Hammon, who does, admittedly, have way to many speaking lines that end in horribly contrived and lame rhyming couplets. Either the language is abused, or it's horribly trite and shallow, according to Smallwood. The only character free of this, is, of course, Simon Eyre, the “mad shoemaker of Tower Street,” who speaks in prose. Contrary to Smallwood, I do not find Eyre's prose to come “with a refreshing vigour [at the beginning of the play] after more than a hundred lines of verse ... It is prose of the most straightforward kind, spoken without fear of its audience ..., providing unequivocal information about himself, his followers, and their intentions.” Of course, much like Milton's God, or the figure of Spirit caught up in the section on sense-certainty in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Eyre's prose is bland and boring—direct, certainly, but only really robotically speaking what is the case. Indeed, if the shoemaker is contiguously situated to the

implicit issue of an infinite excess of desire in Plato, Eyre's language can also be similarly implicated. Eyre's language does strike me as boring—boring in what Thomas Worden called its “linguistic corpulence.” Still, the point here is that, in good Platonic fashion, there is a sharp distinction between those who speak always with sincerity and honesty—these characters always seem to have lines either in prose or blank verse—and those who are always “playing on words, the distancing effect of verbal artifice ... suggesting hollowness and denying any emotional response.”

My choice of the “robotic” description of Eyre's language above was quite purposeful—and it brings me to my second matter, that of sexuality. Eyre's language within his shoemaker's shop is quite odds with the language of this place. Roy J. Booth's really rather brilliant essay, “Meddling with Awl: reading Dekker's *The Shoemaker's Holiday*,” shows how “[t]he business Eyre operates is [only] notionally a shoemaker's shop.” Indeed, Booth's reading is drastically different from Smallwood's Platonic reading of the language. As the former reads it: “As far as comedic effect is concerned this is only a front: what Eyre finds himself in charge of is an innuendo-factory, operating non-stop. The characters/actors are not making shoes, but puns, sexual puns, at a high rate of production.” Booth further notes that it is “worth remark that Eyre never participates in this sexually-loaded banter” and, through this lens, “Eyre's verbosity looks like a *substitute* for the innuendos he can't bring himself to make, doubling his words rather than doubling his entendres.” This avoidance of the sexual and its connection with substitution goes hand-in-hand with the fundamental politics of the shoemaker in Plato. For Socrates, we know, the shoemaker is to always say, as Eyre does towards the end of the play: “I am a handicraftsman, yet my heart is without craft.” The shoemaker and Crab the dog—two peas in a pod, both asserted to never be anything other than themselves. Of course, Dekker's play—



intentional or not—gives the lie to the noble (Platonic) shoemaker who is always only himself—as the shoemaker group in this play is rife not only with people who disguise themselves as shoemakers (like Lacy), but the entire group itself of shoemakers (as Booth noticed) aren't really shoemakers at all because they don't make shoes. Smallwood and numerous others have been content to claim that within the world of Dekker's play we are fully within a kind of escapist fantasy; agreed, but this fantasy is, as I have maintained, thoroughly Platonist in spirit.

This Platonist angle strikes me as significant to a proper understanding of the play as not just a Saturnalia of class, but also a carnival of fetishes, sex, language, and shoes. Plato's thought plays a key role in this festively escapist holiday fantasy—and not simply through Dekker's title. It is not as simple as noticing the King's remark at the end of the play that the joyful and jovial ending of Simon Eyre's banquet shows that “[w]here there is much love, all discord ends.” Marta Straznicky is certainly right to say that this claim “is thus little more than a romantic mask for the economic and political terms in which the ends of discord in *The Shoemaker's Holiday* are in fact defined and achieved.” This “romantic mask,” of course, is not the only one—there is also, through the shoemaker himself who is himself a mask too. Fetishes are masks in their most basic form; the entire play is—at least in terms of its socio-economic-political allegory—just one gigantic fetish. If Dekker's play is a pure “idealization,” then this fantasy is fundamentally one of the fetishist. Using the principle of substitution, the fetishist supplements a lack. Following the typical Zizekian phrasing of the logic of “I know very well, but ...”, the play's central shoemaker, Eyre, would seem to never be anything other than himself—and no more so than with regards to the otherness we find within the realm of sexuality. Booth argued that Dekker's play saw the shoe as “an incipiently fetishistic object in itself”—but I would go further and note how the adverb here in this phrasing already

presupposes the fetish is fully in play and working. The fetish of the shoemaker is a bit heavy-handed perhaps now, but it makes the Platonic angles easier to draw out. Plato suggests that the shoemaker may be an excess—a totally useless excess. The shoemaker may be just like the products he makes. Firk, with his quintessentially sexual wit, is aware of this possibility too when he suggests that Jane may be “laid at one side like a pair of old shoes else, and be occupied for no use.” *The Shoemaker’s Holiday* quite nicely brings together so many elements present in and absent from Plato: excess, uselessness, the sexual possibilities of fetishization, the fetishization of language’s alienating potential, and so much more. All of these elements strongly contribute to the fantasy that is *The Shoemaker’s Holiday*. Sex and shoes—both fantasies and fetishizations of the same “noble lie” Plato handed down to us in his *Republic*.

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## The Scheming Pardoner: Style in Chaucer's *Pardoner's Tale*

Nicholas Wallerstein, Black Hills State University

Scholars have long been interested in the rhetorical qualities of the *Pardoner's Prologue* and *Tale*, especially the homiletic and sermonic aspects of the *Tale*. This famous story of three rioters who go in search of the allegorized character Death and ironically find him in their own deaths beneath a tree where they have found bushels of gold florins has been analyzed by a number of scholars interested in the rhetorical content and structure of the *Tale*. Analyzing the content and structure of the *Tale* is certainly important—corresponding as they do to the first two of the Aristotelian canons of rhetorical composition: invention and arrangement—but an analysis of style can also prove fruitful. And while there is general agreement that the Pardoner's use of rhetoric throughout his *Tale* is morally flawed—based on the Pardoner's deeply damaged spirituality—there is little doubt that much of the style in the *Tale* is effective in traditional Aristotelian ways.

In her *Oxford Guide to The Canterbury Tales*, Helen Cooper has suggested that what stands out immediately in the Pardoner's style is his use of schemes: "The homiletic sections could almost serve as an *ars poetica* of rhetorical figures" (274). Cooper proceeds to list and briefly illustrate many of the figures at use in the Pardoner's sermon, including apostrophe, sententia, enumeratio, polysyndeton and asyndeton, metaphor, transferred epithet, exclamation, synecdoche, anaphora and parison, periphrasis, synonymy, antanaclasis, anastrophe, diazeugma, amplification, and hyperbole (274). Cooper states at the end of her list that the Pardoner's rhetoric is so replete with schemes that "the list could be extended generously." It is the purpose of this article to do just that: to extend the list of figures that the Pardoner uses, and also to provide a more detailed analysis than Cooper gives. Along with some of the figures mentioned

by Cooper, I shall discuss alliteration, assonance, polyptoton, anadiplosis, anastrophe, parallelism, chiasmus, erotema, epanalepsis, tricolon, and epizeuxis.

The opening lines of the *Tale* immediately reveal the Pardoner's stylistic skills. For one thing, the first sentence is nine lines long—one of the longest sentences in the *Prologue* or *Tale*. The glue that will often hold such a long sentence together is the repetition of conjunctions—a repetition known as polysyndeton. In the first six lines of the opening sentence, “and” is used six times, creating the kind of rhythm likely to catch the auditor's attention:

In Flaundes whilom was a compaignye

Of yonge folk that haunteded folye,

As riot, hazard, stywes, *and* tavernes,

Where as with harpes, lutes, *and* gyternes,

They daunce *and* pleyen at dees bothe day *and* nyght,

*And* eten also *and* drynken over hir myght,

Thurgh which they doon the devel sacrificise. (Chaucer 463-469; emphasis added)

Here, the repetition of “and” not only creates beat and rhythm, but also helps to reinforce or emphasize the overindulgence that is the subject of the sentence. The young men go to stews *and* taverns *and* they play at dice day *and* night *and* eat *and* drink too much. Employing polysyndeton therefore allows the pardoner to enhance his topic of excess.

Only a few lines later, the Pardoner continues the repetition of “and,” showing how excess in drinking and gambling often leads to excess in lechery—lechery aided by the presence of the kind of females who tend to frequent taverns:

*And* right anon thanne comen tombesteres

Fetys *and* smale, *and* yonge frutesteres,

Syngeres with harpes, baudes, wafereres,  
Whiche been the verray develes officeres  
To kindle *and* blowe the fyr of lechereye,  
That is annexed unto glotonye. (477-482; emphasis added)

These four uses of “and” continue to show the compounding effect of sin. Using Larry Benson’s glossing, we can see how the Pardoner’s audience witnesses how—*and* right away—“dancing girls” arrive, “elegantly shaped” *and* “slim,” *and* also young “girls who sell fruit,” along with female dancers and “sellers of wafers” (Benson 196, n. 477, n. 478, n. 479). The Pardoner caps off the image of excessive lechery with a classic metaphor of how the girls kindle *and* blow the fires of lust—the emotional effect of which is aided by the polysyndeton.

Another form of repetition employed by the Pardoner is anaphora—repetition of a word or phrase at the beginning of successive lines or clauses. The Pardoner’s first example of anaphora also introduces his audience to another, and highly prominent, rhetorical technique in the *Tale*: the use of ecphrasis, or “exclamation expressing emotion” (Lanham 61). A mere 35 lines into the *Tale*, the Pardoner—with great rhetorical verve—pretends already to be overwhelmed by the horrors of excess, as he dramatically addresses gluttony:

O glotonye, ful of cursednesse!  
O cause first of oure confusioun!  
O original of oure dampnacioun. (498-500)

It is a commonplace in rhetorical theory that three is often a perfect number, so the Pardoner’s repetition of the expressive formation “O” three times is not only an example of anaphora, but *tricolon* anaphora—suggesting that the Pardoner is very adept in his rhetorical skills.

In fact, he seems to be highly aware of the effectiveness of repeating “O” three times, for he does it again 35 lines later in another example of tricolon anaphora and ecphonesis. Here he addresses the stomach (variously referred to as “wombe,” “bely,” and “cod”) and the horrible sounds of belching and flatulence that gluttony leads to:

O wombe! O bely! O stynkyng cod,  
Fulfilled of dong and of corrupcioun!  
At either ende of thee foul is the soun.  
How greet labour and cost is thee to fynde! (534-537)

Adding to the rhetorical panache of this passage is the assonance found in the third line, “foul is the soun.”

His final use of the repetition of “O” comes toward the end of the *Tale*, where he begins his conclusion after the actual story of the three rioters has ended. The only major difference here is that the “O” is repeated four times in row, not three:

O cursed synne of alle cursednesse!  
O traytours homycide, O wikkednesse!  
O glotonye, luxurie, and hasardrye! (895-897)

Perhaps four “Os” are given instead of just three to create even more emphasis—thus heightening the emotional appeal. And there is no doubt that the added rhyming of the three principal words in last line is a nice rhetorical flourish, with “glotonye,” “luxurie,” and “hasardrye” forming a parallelism not only through the rhyme but through the matching number, stresses, and accents of their syllables.

Traditional parallelism, where phrases are matched syntactically, is also used in the sermon. The following passage will provide parallel phrasing in its description of a drunk man’s



face and breath. But sometimes the Pardoner's rhetoric is so dense that as many as seven devices can be found in just a few lines. So along with the parallelism in this passage, we can also note not only more assonance and ecphonestis, but also alliteration, anastrophe, chiasmus, and epizeuxis as well, all in just six lines:

A lecherous thyng is wyn, and dronkenesse  
Is ful of stryvyng and of wrechednesse.  
O dronke man, disfigured is thy face,  
Sour is the breeth, foul artow to embrace,  
And thurgh thy dronke nose semeth the soun  
As though thou seydest ay "Sampsoun, Sampsoun!" (549-554)

We hear the parallelism in the phrases "disfigured is thy face, / Sour is thy breeth, foul artow to embrace"; we note the assonance in words "thyng," "wyn," and "stryvying"; and the ecphonestis in "O dronke man." Alliteration of "s" is found throughout the entire passage—in fact, the "s" is found at least three times in every single line, for a total of 23 "s" sounds in only six lines. The last one-and-a-half lines are especially packed with alliteration, where the audience hears no less than ten "s" sounds in the description of the drunk man's nose: his "nose semeth the soun / As though thou seydest ay 'Sampsoun, Sampsoun.'" The alliteration of the "s" sound here is a fine way to mimic what is obviously the sibilant hissing quality of the drunkard's breathing. And the immediate repetition of "Sampsoun, Sampsoun" is an example of epizeuxis.

The chiasmus and anastrophe in the passage are linked together. The beginning phrase of the passage is anastrophic, with the inversion of the natural syntactic word order. The natural word order would be "wyn is a lecherous thyng," but the Pardoner proclaims "A lecherous thyng is wyn." What adds special effect to this particular example of anastrophe is the fact that the

phrase that follows reverts to normal word order: “and dronkenesse / Is ful of stryvyng.” This crisscrossing pattern creates the chiasmus, which comes from the Greek letter *chi*, which has the same general shape as our English letter “X.” A quick example of another use of chiasmus—indeed, a special kind of chiasmus called antimetabole—comes when the Pardoner quotes St. Paul on the topic of gluttony and how “Mete unto wombe, and wombe eek unto mete, / Shal God destroyed bothe” (522-523). Here the antimetabole, “Mete unto wombe, and wombe . . . unto mete,” is so obvious—like most antimetaboles—that an audience would easily notice it, and therefore be more easily moved by the cleverness of such word play.

Lastly, we shall run through just a few more quick examples of schemes. There is antithesis, as in this description of the man who drinks Spanish wine:

That whan a man hath drunken draughtes thre,  
And weneth that he be at hoom in Chepe,  
He is in Spaigne, right at the toune of Lepe—  
Nat at the Rochele, ne at Burdeux toun. (568-571)

There is anadiplosis—the repetition of a word at the end of a clause and then at the beginning of the very next clause—as in this quotation from St. Paul: “Ther walken manye of whiche yow toold have I— / I seye it now wepyng, with pious voys” (530-531).

There is polyptoton—two forms of a word derived from the same root—as in this declaration the Pardoner makes about the rioters killing the allegorized character Death: “Deeth shall be deed, if that they may hym hente!” (710).

There is asyndeton—the opposite of polysyndeton, where no connective conjunction is used between words—as in the Pardoner’s plea to his audience to bring him offerings, such as “silver brooches, spoones, rynges” (908). One would normally expect an “or” before the final

item in the list, the rynges. Leaving out the “or” implies the list could go on and on—just as we would expect from the avaricious Pardoner.

And there is erotema, or rhetorical question, found in the Pardoner’s concluding remarks:

Allas, mankynde, how may it bitide  
That to thy creatour, which that the wroghte  
And with his precious herte-blood thee boghte,  
Thou art so fals and so unkynde, allas? (900-903)

Adding extra flair to this rhetorical question is the fact that the sentence begins and ends with the same word, “allas”—a repetition that not only emphasizes the woe that mankind brings upon himself by being false to God, but is also an example of yet another scheme: epanalepsis.

In conclusion, the rhetorical schemes, tropes, and turns of phrase employed by the Pardoner—and we have only looked at a sampling out of many examples—show him to be highly skilled in the techniques of style. The scholars are no doubt correct that the Pardoner is a deeply evil man—an assassin of souls, an utter nihilist, a malevolent, self-promoting devil. He can, however, be simultaneously good with words. And while it is true that he uses his stylistic skills for diabolic purposes, we can at least recognize—and perhaps even admire—his impressive rhetorical dynamism. Indeed, there is every possibility that his success as a thief is due in large measure to the brilliance of his language. After all, schemes and tropes are often not recognized explicitly by an audience, but their powers are effective nonetheless. It is a commonplace in Chaucerian scholarship that, by the end of his *Tale*, the Pardoner is so convinced of his persuasive abilities to get people to part with their wealth that he thinks he can defraud the other pilgrims as easily as he does the country-bumpkin audiences of his sermons—a miscalculation that leads to the Host’s attack against him, threatening to castrate him (or at least

revealing that the Pardoner has already been castrated, thus humiliating him). Perhaps it is the linguistic firepower of his stylistic skills that convinces the Pardoner of his abilities. But the fact that the pilgrims—or at least the Host, Harry Bailly—don't fall for his tricks doesn't mean that the best trick up his sleeve isn't his use of schemes.

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